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Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter are worthy 
of examination because in many ways their tenures on the 
Supreme Court present a fascinating study in similarity. The 
influence of his friend and mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
is clearly visible in the career of Felix Frankfurter. 
Because neither jurist can be labeled as either liberal or 
conservative, the opinions they rendered often found the 
legalistic issues of specific cases superseding political 
expediency, and often the reverse was true. For both, the 
integrity of the law would repeatedly take precedence over 
their shared skepticism, and though surely patriots, neither 
man believed that the Constitution must be read as an 
unchanging catechism. It was such complexity of philosophy 
which made the time each spent on the Supreme Court so 
important to the history of American jurisprudence. Had 
either walked an absolutists line, he might have left a far 
less impressive heritage.
To study these men is to be privy to a relationship 
which began at Harvard Law School and displayed itself in a 
shared intellectual elitism that importantly defined the 
years each of them sat on the bench.
Examining their work is discovering a strong thread of 
similarity which binds both their lives in law and their
philosophy as human beings. Because neither can be
irrevocably categorized, they are representative of that 
special quality which sets the memorable apart from the 
ordinary.
What I plan is an examination of the most telling cases 
in the careers of both of these great judges. My interest is 
in presenting documentation that their decisions were hardly 
characteristic of an always divinable ideology.
Inconsistency gave color to both their careers on the 
Court. The possibility that the human intellect is capable 
of finding new answers is appropriate to a true 
understanding of the credo which underscored the juristic 
lives of Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. It 
is the sense of what represents the responsibility of a 
Supreme Court justice which joins them, and it is in their
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In 1938, Felix Frankfurter published his book,
Mr.Justice Holmes And the Supreme Court. In the
introduction, Frankfurter said:
It is plain, therefore, that judges are not merely 
expert reporters of pre-existing law. Because of 
the free play of judgment allowed by the 
Constitution, judges inevitably fashion law. And 
law is one of the shaping forces of society...We 
speak of the Court as though it were an
abstraction. To be sure, the Court is an
institution, but individuals, with all their 
diversities of endowment, experience and outlook, 
determine its actions.
Justice Frankfurter is an enigma for those who would 
categorize the judges who have served on the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Must we put only certain men in the 
camp of the Legal Realists and others into that of the 
Formalists? Can we draw the lines so sharply, or must we
accept the fact that we deprive ourselves of understanding 
in our desire to place individuals in discreet ideological 
packages? Oliver Wendell Holmes is generally accepted as the 
prime exponent of Legal Realism on the Court, but both he 
and his novitiate, Felix Frankfurter, often appeared to
■̂Frankfurter, Felix, Mr. Justice Holmes And The Supreme Court 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938) P.8
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stand somewhere in legal limbo as we consider their
decisions. The Constitution was clearly not an unchanging
document for either man. The Court's members must recognize
the intentional "vagueness" which characterized
Constitutional law, but they must also not overstep what
both saw as the necessary bounds of their position. Rather
than seeing the Constitution as a rigid set of stipulated
liberties, Frankfurter insisted that it rested upon an
historical evolution of basic ideas. His judicial restraint
meant an awareness that the Supreme Court had to limit its
intervention into political questions. Frankfurter sought
his to be a rational, balanced, system-conserving position.
His "realism" was not always unconditional. The Court was
only to be political when the situation appeared to require
it. The People alone could enjoy the privilege of unfettered
political opinion, but the judge must serve as "teacher" in
the Socratic sense.
Freed from absolute and immutable first 
principles, the judge, through the disinterested 
exercise of judgment, could adapt principle to the 
changing needs of the progressive society.
The rise of the expert, in his view, was 
democracy's inevitable response to a changing 
world; the judge, given the same freedom, would 
protect democracy from its own divisive forces.
 ̂Silverstein. Mark. Constitutional Faiths (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1984) P. 55
Accepting what was the primary responsibility of the 
Court and commingling it with his Constitutional viewpoint, 
Justice Frankfurter's legal philosophy found him balancing 
between two warring ideological camps. His was surely not 
the apparently "formalist" position of those, like Justice 
Black, who would choose to incorporate the tenets of the 
Bill of Rights into any and all decisions, nor was it that 
of others who would ask of the judge that he be purely a 
"relativistic" political animal.
Neither Felix Frankfurter or his mentor, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, can be considered categorical realists in the 
accepted sense of the word. They were, no doubt, 
"progressive" as to their more open reading of the 
Constitution, but neither ignored those necessary limits 
which must exist as it concerned the extent of the Court's 
decision making power. The Court must not be totally 
political nor dogmatically literal.
Balance was the issue for Frankfurter, and having 
chosen this position for himself, his decisions on the bench 
would vary from formalistic to skeptical--from non-political
to political from liberal to conservative from rule
oriented to pragmatic.
Both men are often examples of a paradoxical philosophy 
of judicial behavior. Both, as they grew older, came to re­
consider their over-riding skepticism. Neither Frankfurter
or Holmes would retire from the bench having remained 
unchangingly faithful to a realist point of view.
Holmes and Frankfurter are worthy of examination 
because in many ways their individual tenures on the Supreme 
Court present a fascinating study in similarity. The 
influence of his friend and mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
is clearly visible in the career of Felix Frankfurter. 
Because neither jurist can be labeled as either conservative 
or liberal, the opinions they rendered often found the 
legalistic issues of specific cases superseding political 
expediency. For both, the integrity of the law would 
repeatedly take precedence over their shared skepticism, and 
though surely patriots, neither man believed that the 
Constitution must be read as an unchanging catechism. It was 
such complexity of philosophy which made the time each spent 
on the Supreme Court so important to the history of American 
jurisprudence. Had either walked an absolutists line, he 
might have left a far less impressive heritage.
To study these great judges is to be privy to a 
relationship which began at Harvard Law School and would 
display itself in a shared intellectual elitism that 
importantly defined the years each of them sat on the bench. 
Examining their work is discovering a strong thread of 
similarity which bound their lives in law and their 
philosophy as human beings. Because neither can be
categorized, they are representative of that special quality
which sets the memorable apart from the ordinary.
What I plan here is an examination of the most telling 
cases in the careers of both these men. My interest is in 
presenting documentation that their decisions were hardly
characteristic of an always divinable ideology. Their 
inconsistency was what gave color to both their careers on 
the Court. The possibility that the human intellect is 
capable of finding new answers is appropriate to a true 
understanding of the credo which underscored the judicial 
lives of both. The sense that the basic essence of American 
jurisprudence was constructive openness to change is that 
philosophy which we can find reflected in their contribution 
to the history of the Supreme Court.
Socrates might well have argued that both teacher and 
students can grow in the dialogic process. Holmes and 
Frankfurter developed in context with a particular sort of 
dialectic. For them, that dialogue was both a personal as 
well as a public phenomenon. Frankfurter’s words speak well 
to such a belief. Self-contradiction was not always a 
negative for him. It could often be characteristic of 
positive evolution.1*
*In 1941, Frankfurter wrote, "It would be comfortable to discover 
a Procrustean formula.. .If such were the process of Constitutional 
adjudications in this most sensitive field, it would furnish an almost 
automatic task of applying mechanical formula and would hardly call for 
the labors of Marshall or Taney, of Holmes or Cardozo. To look for such
6
Legal Realism, which reached its peak in the 1930s and
early 1940s, argued that contradictory and conflicting
decisions pervade the law:
Judicial decision making is not and cannot be 
fashioned from logical deduction. The realist 
claims that formalism must fail because of the 
limits of our language and logic and the 
indeterminacy of moral and normative concepts.
Under this view, concepts are not embedded in 
nature but are merely conventions of social 
life... Words are created, defined, and applied by 
people saturated by their social conditions and 
historical context. Each act of judicial 
interpretation is therefore an act of social 
choice. To truly understand what underlies 
judicial decision making, we are bound to look at 
the behavior of judges and not at abstract legal 
argument.
So, if we are to validate any claim that both Holmes 
and Frankfurter stood as primary examples of a realist 
philosophy, it is incumbent upon us that we examine their 
performance as adjudicators, recognizing the arguable fact 
that neither of these men stood irrevocably in the realist 
camp. Based on such a judgment, and predicated upon my 
belief that by its very nature Realism necessitates an 
awareness of the "social context" within which a decision is
talismanic formula is to assume that the broad guarantees of the 
Constitution can fulfill their purpose without the nourishment of 
history."
 ̂ For a ccnprehensive examination of the history of Legal Realism, 
see Edward Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1973), P. 74-94.
®Raymond A. Belliotti, Justifying Law (Phi 1 adel phi a: Tenpl e 
University Press, 1992) P. 7.
7
made, I have chosen individuals who were surely conscious of
their social responsibility, but were also at all times
cognizant of their legal obligations as well. Neither man
saw himself as a free-wheeling dispenser of the societal
good. Both balanced his performance on the Supreme Court
between social need and Constitutional supremacy. The law of
the land remained for each the central point out of which
decision making would emanate. Max Lerner argues:
Accordingly, he favored exercising the judicial 
power only where there was an obvious abuse of 
national power or an encroachment of function by 
the national government or one of its branches, 
and (with respect for the states) only when there 
was a real danger of the serious dislocation of 
the federal system".
Both Holmes and Frankfurter served on the Court at 
times in which concept innovation flourished. But as it 
concerns the issue of civil liberties, they often remained 
faithful to a more "conservative" stance. Their decisions 
were often less characteristic of the social innovator, and 
more those of the controlled interlocutor, the individual 
who sought first to protect what he saw as the maintenance 
of the nation's survival.
Oliver Wendell Holmes the mentor, and Felix Frankfurter 
the willing novitiate, are the subjects of this examination.
^Max Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes. (New York: The 
Modem Library, 1943), P. 127.
They were men of their particular century, but in many ways 
represented points of view that make them anything but 
paradigmatic. It is that sense of what represents the 
responsibility of a Supreme Court justice which joined them 
and it is in their work where it may be found.
CHAPTER 2
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE MENTOR JOINS THE COURT
The year 1902 marked the appointment of Oliver Wendell
Holmes to the Supreme Court of the United States. He was
sixty-one years of age, with a personal history that
encompassed thousands of cases decided during his tenure on
the Massachusetts Court from 1882 to 1902.
Holmes's selection by President Theodore Roosevelt was
clearly in line with the precedent which has been
established over America's history. Presidents continue to
chose members of the Court who represent their own political
philosophies. Roosevelt had selected Holmes for several
reasons. Firstly, with the retirement of Justice Howard Gray
of Massachusetts, it appeared that the choice of another
Massachusetts man to replace him was appropriate. Max Lerner
says of Roosevelt:
He was attracted by the combination of the scholar 
with a distinguished military career, and the 
statesman with a literary and historical bent...
He was attracted also by Holmes's high reputation 
for legal ability and learning. And as for the 
dissents which Holmes had returned in the labor 
cases and which had brought down upon him the 
contumely of the men of substance, Roosevelt was 
not one to balk at that.
^Max Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, (New York'.The 
Modem Library, 1943), P. xxxi.
9
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Theodore Roosevelt's major concern was whether Holmes, 
a man he believed was surely a nationalist, would 
consistently keep in mind "his relations with his fellow 
statesmen who in other branches of the government are 
striving... to advance the ends of government."* It would 
appear that further inquiry into Judge Holmes's political 
philosophy eventually satisfied the President of his 
qualifications. Trust busting was in the air, and Roosevelt, 
a political realist, recognized that it was in his best 
interests that he accept the inevitable forces of political 
change while also attempting to stay in command. His choice 
of Holmes reflected the desire that the man he selected was 
"sane and sound on the great national policies." Satisfied 
that he was right, Oliver Wendell Holmes was nominated by 
the President and quickly approved by the United States 
Senate.
The early days of Holmes's tenure were surely a great 
disappointment for Roosevelt. That characteristic quality 
which is recognizable in Mr. Justice Holmes was his lack of 
predictability. The persistently individualized stature 
which would find its reflection in many of the positions 
Holmes would take in his years on the Supreme Court will be 
dealt with in a later chapter, but suffice it to say, Holmes 
was to display his own jurisprudential perspective, and in
hbid.
its particular quality it would defy categorization. In 1913
in a speech given at a diner of the Harvard Law School
Association of New York, Holmes said:
It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious 
or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other 
prematurely into the law, and forgets that what 
seem to him to be first principles are believed by 
half his fellow men to be wrong... Judges are apt 
to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need 
something of Mephistopheles. We too need education 
in the obvious--to learn to transcend our own 
convictions and to leave room for much that we 
hold dear to be done away with short of revolution 
by the orderly change of law.
Holmes was not always an unmistakably "political"
member of the Court. He would argue for change, and position
himself against it. He was also not a man who felt himself
and his fellow jurists omnipotent:
I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be 
imperiled if we could not make that declaration 
as to the laws of the several states. For one in 
my place sees how often a local policy prevails 
with those who are not trained to national views 
and how often action is taken that embodies what 
the Commerce Clause was meant to end. But I am not 
aware that there is any serious desire to limit 
the Court's power in this regard.
For most of the things that properly can be called 
evils in the present state of the law I think the 
main remedy, as for the evils of public opinion, 
is for us to grow more civilized.
A Republican Roosevelt would find his reflection some
3Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Ccrrpany, 1920), P. 295
10 Ibid. P. 296
11
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thirty five years later in another member of the Roosevelt
family. Franklin Roosevelt, a Democrat, would also discover
that he couldn't definitively predict the political behavior
of his Supreme Court selections. He too would come to
realize that more than simply political expediency would
determine the decisions of certain of his Supreme Court
nominees. It is important to note that Theodore Roosevelt
was not entirely sure that Holmes's could be relied upon to
always make what in the President's judgment would be the
most politically expeditious choices. In 1901, just a year
prior to his confirmation, Holmes had spoken on the
anniversary of the day on which John Marshall had taken his
seat as Chief Justice. There is no doubt that this speech
radiated respect and reverence, but in Holmes's words we
perhaps may find a better understanding first of his
humility, and more importantly of his personal views as they
related to the position he would soon hold:
A great man represents a great ganglion in the
nerves of society, or, to vary the figure, a
strategic point in the campaign of history, and 
part of his greatness consists in his being 
there... When we celebrate Marshall we celebrate 
at the same time and indivisibly the inevitable 
fact that the oneness of the nation and the 
supremacy of the national Constitution were 
declared to govern the dealings of man with man by 
the judgments and decrees of the most august 
courts.
11 Ibid. P. 268
13
So how may we adequately define this judge whom we may
also consider a "great ganglion" in his own right? It is in
attempting to understand that particular philosophy which
influenced his decision making on the Supreme Court that a
clearer picture of Oliver Wendell Holmes may emerge.
Ronald Dworkin argues that Holmes wrote like a dream.
The Justice's personal conversion from the position that the
First Amendment must be limited to a Blackstonian
disapprobation of prior restraint to a radically changed
view that it must be understood as a much more abstract and
general principle, was a turning point in American
Constitutional history. According to Dworkin, most of
Holmes's epigrams were representative of only very lazy
thoughts, and his philosophical pretensions were almost
always characteristic of an unsophisticated, deeply cynical
17form of skepticism. They were, in fact, embarrassing.
But to agree that such criticism has any validity, we must
fail to adequately recognize the scholar who in 1881 wrote:
The law embodies the story of a nation's 
evelopment through many centuries, and it cannot 
be dealt with as if it contained only axioms and 
corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to 
know what it is we must know what it has been, and 
what it tends to become, we must alternately 
consult history and existing theories of 
1egislation.
Ronald Dworkin, "Unenxmerated Rights: Whether and Hew Roe Should 
Be Overruled", in ed. Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard A. Epstein and Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Bill of Rights in the Modem State (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), P. 392
14
But the most difficult labor will be to understand 
the combination of the two into new products at 
every stage. The substance of the law at any given 
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, 
with what is then understood to be convenient, but 
its form and machinery, and the degree to which it 
is able to work out desired results, depend very 
much upon the past.
The point of view which defined the career of Mr. 
Justice Holmes, and which it is reasonable to argue was what 
made him so vitally significant to the history of the 
Supreme Court, represented a combination of historical 
understanding, recognition of existing theories of 
legislation and the desire that they might combine and 
produce something new and more importantly appropriate to 
their time in history. Here was a man who remained 
intellectually active on into the last days of his tenure on 
the Court. An openness to knowledge, and a scholarly desire 
for exposure to the ideas of others is eloquently exhibited 
in the correspondence between the judge and Harold Laski.
Laski, a friend of the still very young, Felix 
Frankfurter, was introduced to Holmes in the early days of 
1916. This relationship continued to reflect Laski's 
earliest correspondence and remained an obvious source of 
personal and intellectual growth for both Laski and the man 
he so honored. The words of the brilliant, budding teacher
^Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Caiman Law, (Boston: Little 
Broun S Carpany: Copyrights 1881, 1909,1923 by Oliver Wendell Holmes) p. 
2-3
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and intellectual define how he saw the man who was the 
mentor of his friend Felix Frankfurter, "I do not say 'thank 
you'-- not merely because it is inadequate but because from 
one's master one learns that it is simply duty to receive. 
You teach our generation how we may hope to l i v e . T h e  
dialogue Laski shared with Holmer, continued on into the very 
last days of the Justice's life.
In his foreword to Mark DeWolfe Howe's compilation of 
these extraordinarily telling letters, Felix Frankfurter, no 
stranger to this very special relationship, noted that 
Holmes and Laski were obviously men apart. Much about them 
would seem to have inevitably kept them apart, but the 
reasons of divergence, antecedents, age, preoccupations and 
geography were ameliorated by the joining of their feeling 
for one another and by the intensity and depth of their 
intellectual interests.^
Frankfurter, perhaps far better than most, enjoyed a 
relationship with Holmes that spanned many of the years 
Justice Holmes sat on the Supreme Court. The undeniable 
influence of the older man on who and what this willing 
"novitiate" would one day become is reflected not only in
 ̂̂ Holmes -Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and 
Harold J. Laski, Edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe, With a Foreward by Felix 
Frankfurter (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953)
^ Ibid., P. xvi
16
the metamorphosis that would take place in the younger, 
strongly liberal Frankfurter, but would find a surprising 
mirror in his behavior as a justice of the Supreme Court.
In light of Mr. Dworkin's remarks, and attempting to 
arrive at a judgement as to how Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes can be appropriately understood, it appears 
worthwhile that we look at some of the diversity of view 
that exists regarding his judicial philosophy.
Examining the transformation that has characterized 
constitutional interpretation and judicial power in America, 
Christopher Wolfe says that the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth centuries saw a dramatic 
change in the understanding of judicial power that prevailed 
in the legal profession and among legal scholars. The new 
understanding was fostered by a variety of developments-- 
the rise of legal positivism, historicism, sociological 
jurisprudence, and legal realism.^
In his chapter, "The Judge as Legislator for Social 
Welfare," Wolfe comments that Holmes was undoubtedly the 
great prophet and patriarch of the new judicial power. He 
says that it is difficult to communicate a sense of the 
extraordinary tributes offered to Holmes from a wide variety 
of sources. The reason for all these encomiums is best
^ Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modem Judicial Review, (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1986) P. 4
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explained by two factors. The first, and of lesser
significance, is one that Holmes himself would have
appreciated. The judgment of history has followed Holmes's
own. The judge's positions on the great issues before the
Supreme Court in the first part of the twentieth century,
specifically in the areas of economic regulation and free
speech, have been adopted by the Court and serve as the
basis for most modern constitutional law.
The second factor is a much deeper theoretical victory
gained by Holmes. He has shaped more modern thought on the
nature of law and the judicial process than any other 
17American. Holmes is the exponent of an historically 
oriented, constitutionally centered realism, and referring 
to Missouri v Holland, Wolfe sees Justice Holmes's point of 
view as, at worst, that constitutional provisions were "dead 
mistakes" that had disintegrated. At best, they needed to be 
developed and to receive an 'improved form,' more in accord
JOwith what this country had become. Emerging as a 
"conservative" innovator, Holmes was aware that 
constitutional law can avoid the problems of the rigidity or 
inflexibility of written documents, which are difficult to 
change through formal processes such as amendments. Such 
occurrences might be minimized, virtually eliminated by
11 Ibid.., P. 223-224 
U Ibid., P. 228
18
having forms so broad as to be adaptable to all necessary 
19rules. Modern constitutional law rests on the
interpretation of certain key constitutional provisions that
are thought of as formal enough to provide judges with the
opportunity to lay down an appropriate rule for any
circumstance. Limitations on judges are a matter of self-
restraint. Not specifically seen as constitutional 
901imi tati ons.
As one attempts to draw closer to the essence of 
Justice Holmes's legal philosophy, it becomes ever more 
clear that he was anything but always predictable. For some, 
the very contradictory nature of his performance on the 
Supreme Court was what has made him so significant. If there 
were contradictions in his philosophy, they were joined with 
a belief that lines must be drawn only in the event of 
extreme circumstances. If morality is only a check on force, 
Holmes would nevertheless spend his life in underlining the 
value of courage, of truth and of tolerance. His response to 
critics would have been that life is too short, and is full 
of contradictions,^ and it is on the grounds of his 
overriding skepticism that Justice Holmes is often
19 Ibzd., P. 228
20 Ibid., P. 229
22Francis Biddle, Mr. Justice Holmes. (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1942) P. 127
19
criticized. Francis Biddle provides a wonderful insight into
Holmes's legal philosophy when he includes in the early
pages of his study of the Justice, a quotation that had
apparently been importantly marked in Holmes's papers, and
dated October 6, 1885. Biddle suggests that this quotation
from Cairds, Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte must
have struck the judge as curiously satisfying. It offered a
bridge between his doubts as to the value of all ultimates,
and his faith in life and his traditions and aspirations as
17an integral part of that life on the other.
Perhaps, if we are to better understand Mr. Holmes, we
must take cognizance of these words which seem to have so
strongly influenced both his philosophy and his
jurisprudence:
All criticism of the whole system of things to 
which we belong is, from a truly 'relative' point 
of view, irrational. For the critic, and the 
standard by which he criticizes, cannot be 
separated from that system...It has often been 
pointed out that a logical skepticism cannot be 
universal ... Doubt must rest on a basis of 
certitude, or it will destroy itself. But it is 
not less true, though it is less frequently 
noticed, that all criticism of the world, while it 
detects evil in particular, implies an ultimate 
optimism. For, if such criticism pretends to be 
more than the utterance of the tastes and wishes 
of an individual, it must claim to be the 
expression of an objective principle--a principle 
which, in spite of all appearances to the 
contrary, is realizing itself in the world.
“ Ibid., P. 13 
11 Ibid. P. 13
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Returning again to Christopher Wolfe's estimate of 
Holmes, we may find more on the subject of the justice's 
alleged skepticism. Holmes as a legal positivist, was very 
hostile to the very notion of natural law. He believed that 
the doctrine of natural law, that concept which argued that 
there were certain principles objectively knowable and valid 
always and everywhere, was merely a result of men's 
confusing the familiar with the necessary. Holmes had 
applied this skepticism as much to economics as he did to 
moral philosophy or metaphysics.
The role of a judge was not to enforce the natural law. 
He must enforce the positive law, the laws made by men. 
Judicial review, as Holmes saw it, was the enforcement of 
the most fundamental positive law, the Constitution. In a 
case where the issue dealt with enforcing a very vague 
constitutional provision, such as due process, Holmes would 
argue that the Court should be very slow to strike down 
legislative acts. After all, the legislature's notions as to 
what did (or did not) constitute arbitrary action were as 
likely to be right as the judges'. Judicial review was 
appropriate only when legislation deprived citizens, without 
any rational basis, of rights that were fundamental and 
accepted by virtue of tradition. Where traditional
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understanding of fundamental rights was at issue, the judge 
must defer to the legislature.^
So we have now been introduced to Holmes the 
positivist, Holmes the constitutionalist, the historicist, 
the skeptic, etc. And, we may find in the work of Thomas C. 
Grey yet another Mr. Holmes, and that is Holmes the 
pragmatist, the man who was capable of resolving the 
disparate elements in his philosophy and combining them to 
create a coherent whole.
Robert W. Gordon's reading of Grey's point of view 
indicates that he had once been inclined to see Holmes's 
positivism, his formalism and conceptualist projects as 
representing unresolved contradictions with his historicism. 
He has, however, convincingly reconciled the two through 
imputing to Holmes a pragmatic move. It seems reasonable to 
believe that for the sake of making the lawyer's task of 
finding and applying doctrine easier, Holmes had indeed been 
determined to refine the classification scheme, the logical 
arrangement of doctrine into conceptual categories. In this 
sense he was a conceptualist. He was also a formalist, in 
the sense of seeking decision rules that would increase 
legal certainty by generating predictable results.
His historicism told him that a large part of the law in any 
period would consist of the contingent and irrational.
‘̂S'upra. Note 16., P. 161
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Conceptual categories could never be more than provisional 
aids to help practitioners sort out the cases, guidelines 
for decisions, starting points for legal reasoning. They 
could never reguire any particular results.^
David Burton would have us understand that it is 
"artificial" to attempt to study Holmes's jurisprudence away 
from his politics. There is a necessary "symbiosis" between 
the two. The judge's well-known advocacy of judicial 
restraint was analogous to an abiding respect for the will 
of legislatures, whether they spoke for the people of a 
state or the citizens of the United States. Holmes was 
clearly a republican--a man who respected the the work of an 
elective body, but was only interested in interfering with 
its procedures in the most extreme circumstances.^
It is in the lack of agreement, in the plethora of 
opinion that one finds concerning this enigmatic judge where 
he must hopefully emerge. Felix Frankfurter speaks well to 
the necessity that our understanding of Holmes be predicated 
upon that very diversity which characterizes our subject.
In a book written by this man who would ultimately 
prove himself the willing acolyte of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
"Introduction: Holmes Shadow", ed. Robert W. Gordon .The Legacy of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr. (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1992) P. 9-10
^David H. Burton, Political Ideas of Justice Holmes. ( New 
Jersey,London and Toronto::Associated University Presses, 1992) P. 103
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Jr., there surfaces a picture surprisingly similar to that
which would later be used to define the writer as well:
These instances must suffice to show the different 
considerations that determined Mr. Justice Holmes' 
mind when he sat in judgement on legislation 
attempting economic readjustments as against 
legislation restricting freedom of utterance. Just 
as he would allow experiments in economics which 
he himself viewed with doubt and distrust, so he 
would protect speech that offended his taste and 
wisdom. At bottom, both attitudes came from a 
central faith and a governing skepticism. Since 
the whole of truth has not yet been, and is not 
likely to be, brought up from its bottomless well, 
the first duty of an educated man was to doubt his 
major premise even while he continued to act on 
it. This was the skeptical conviction with which 
he distrusted dogma, whether economic or 
intellectual. But his was never the paralyzing 
skepticism which easily becomes comfortable or 
corroding cynicism.
An examination of Holmes's record on the Supreme Court 
may hope to find a better understanding of that philosophy 
which would effect his often disparate decisions. It seems 
unfair to relegate his actions to the realm of "cynicism" 
without understanding that the skeptic, the person who is 
aware that doubt is the provence of the truly wise, must 
make his choices with greater honesty, with greater 
humility.
•) 7
-'Felix Frankfurter, Mr.Justice Holmes And The Supreme Court, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938) P. 61-62
Contradiction is not always a sign of vacillation. It can 
also demand a strength of character and an individuality 
which rarely pleases all. We remember the non-conformist. 
The ordinary gets lost in the crowd.
CHAPTER 3
HOLMES AND THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was the product of a 
generation. The contradictory character that often pervaded 
his decision making, if examined as the result of a 
"growing” phenomenon, may be more appropriate to a better 
understanding of the man as both an individual and a member 
of the Supreme Court of the United States. That 
inconsistency we find in Holmes decisions is in fact 
consistent with the social philosophy he brought to the 
Court, and even more importantly with the ideas that 
pervaded the "indefinite" world that produced his personal 
history. All of us are influenced by our beginnings. Human 
beings, their roots, the intellectual milieu in which they 
develop and the society that contributes the earliest 
foundations for a worldview are inextricably interrelated. 
Holmes's legal philosophy is clearly the result of such a 
"visit."a
^ Written in 1917,"The Love Seng of J.Alfred Prufrock", T.S.
Elliot's masterpiece of poetic history speaks eloquently to the world in 
which Holmes developed. "'Let us go then, you and I, When the evening is 
spread out against the sky.. .To lead you to an overwhelming 
question.. .Oh do not ask, 'What is it?’ Let us go and make our visit."
25
26
Born in the "developmental" years of the 19th century
in America, Justice Holmes was a man who had known the
horrors of a Civil War that threatened not only his personal
world but the stability of his nation. Surviving the
ugliness, he had returned to the home of his upper class
Brahman father to study law at Harvard and beyond this
fortuitous decision, to ply his trade as an attorney in a
world alive with change. America in the latter years of the
19th century provided the seedbed for the philosophy of a
Ralph Waldo Emerson, a Henry David Thoreau and a John Dewey.
The worldview that pervades the work of such as these,
also characterizes the words of the ever curious
intellectual who in 1915 wrote for the Illinois Law Review:
To get a little nearer to the practical our 
current ethics and our current satisfaction with 
conventional legal rules, it seems to me, can be 
purged to a certain extent without reference to 
what our final ideal may be. To rest upon a 
formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means 
death...To doubt one’s own principles is the mark 
of a civilized man. To know what you want and why 
you think that such a measure will help it is the 
first but by no means the last step towards 
intelligent legal reform.
The "revolt against formalism" which Morton White 
examines is the social movement which colors the legal 
philosophy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He speaks of the 
19th century, that century which had transcended the 18th
0 Q“ See Holmes, "Ideals and Doubts, ” Illinois Law Review, vol. X, 
(1915) p. 3
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through its concern with change, process, history and 
culture. This was the century of history, evolutionary 
biology, psychology and sociology, historical jurisprudence 
and economics. It was also the century of Comte, Darwin, 
Hegel, Marx and Spencer. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that we find American intellectuals in the eighteen 
nineties, positioning themselves against formalism, since 
they had been convinced that logic, abstraction, deduction, 
mathematics, and mechanics were inadequate to social 
research and incapable of containing the rich, moving, 
living current of social life.^
It is difficult for one who studies Holmes not to 
recognize a multiplicity of facets. Here was surely more 
than simply a student of the law. Holmes is better 
understood, as Judge Richard A. Posner would volunteer, as a 
"writer-philosopher" in the vein of Nietzsche, a man who 
interestingly had been Holmes's contemporary. The Justice's 
attitudes were often not far from Sarte or Heidegger, also 
men who emerged from the metamorphosis of the late 19th 
century. One finds in studying Holmes's, allusions to 
pragmatism, utilitarianism, atheism, (nineteenth century) 
liberalism, materialism, aestheticism, utilitarianism, 
militarism, biological, social, and historical Darwinism,
^Morton White, Social Thought In America (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1968) P. 11
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skepticism, nihilism, Nietzschean vitalism and "will to 
power," Calvinism, logical positivism, stoicism, 
behaviorism, and existentialism. Together with these is the 
explicit rejection of most of these 'isms' and a sheer zest 
for living that may be the central plank in the Holmesian 
piatform.^
As one acquaints oneself with Holmes"s predecessors, we
are surprised to find many of his insights and even
expressions anticipated. With power and ingenuity Holmes
synthesized, reformulated, and extended the ideas and
17expression of those who had gone before him.
In his famous essay, "The Path of The Law," a Harvard
Law Review article written in March of 1897, Holmes was
surely the scholar in search of the truth. He was the
skeptical philosopher often walking in the steps of men like
David Hume. Choosing not to pontificate, he was rather the 
humble student trying to find his way back along the path 
law had taken, a path that had led to a specific point in 
its history. Here was a man of the law who would pursue such 
a road for the remainder of his long life:
the rational study of law is still to a large 
extent the study of history. History must be a 
part of the study, because without it we cannot
*̂Richard A . Posner(ed. )The Essential Holmes, (Chicago: Universi ty 
of Chicago Press, 1992),Intro. P. xix-xx
^ Ibid., P. xii
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know the precise scope of the rules which it is 
our business to know. It is a part of the rational 
study, because it is the first step toward an 
enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a 
deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those 
rul es .33
Holmes's seminal book, The Common Law, published in
1881, was not the work of a pedant. Here again is another
"skeptical" journey. He would have us look at the past so
that perhaps we might find some indicators as to how to
better anticipate the future:
The law embodies the story of a nation's 
development through many centuries, and it cannot 
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms 
and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order 
to know what it is, we must know what it has been 
and what it tends to become. We must alternately 
consult history and existing theories of 
legislation. But the most difficult labor will be 
to understand the combination of the two into new 
products at every stage.
Any attempt toward defining Mr. Justice Holmes, and 
tying together the multiplicity of views to be found in the 
literature with reference to this man, necessarily requires 
that the researcher find his or her personal path toward the 
truth. Scholarly debate with regard to this enigmatic 
individual has raged from the time of his earliest days on 
the bench on into the present moment. His belief that truth
"See Holmes, "The Path of The Law, " Harvard Law 
Revjiew, Vol. X, March 25, 1897, P. 469
^ Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown,
1881)p.1
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was a changing issue is what often makes his categorization 
impossible.
John Dewey speaks well to the need that change must be
endemic to human thought. How much like Holmesian philosophy
are his words:
The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that 
the function of mind is to project new and more 
complex ends--to free experience from routine and 
from caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish 
purposes already given either in the mechanism of 
the body or in that of the existent state of 
society, but the use of intelligence to liberate 
and liberalize action, is the pragmatic lesson.
Action restricted to given and fixed ends may 
attain great technical efficiency; but efficiency 
is the only quality to which it can lay claim.
Such action is mechanical (or becomes so), no 
matter what the scope of the performed end, be it
the Will of God or Kultur.
But the doctrine that intelligence develops within 
the sphere of action for the sake of possibilities 
not yet given is the opposite of a doctrine of 
mechanical efficiency. Intelligence as 
intelligence is inherently forward-looking; only 
by ignoring its primary function does it become a 
mere means for an end already given. The latter is 
servile, even when the end is labeled moral, 
religious or aesthetic. But action directed to 
ends to which the agent has not previously been 
attached inevitably carries with it a quickened 
and enlarged spirit. A pragmatic intelligence is a 
creative intelligence, not a routine mechanic.
Morton White writes, that Holmes and Veblen both
believed that law and economics were empirical sciences.
They wanted to be free of prejudice and belief in final
^"The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Creative 
Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude. by John 
Dewey and others (New York: Holt, 1917) p.63-64
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causes; wishing to make a distinction between what they
found and what they wanted to find. The same distinction
invariably turns up in Holmes's writing, particularly in his
conception of legal duty and in his perception of the law
itself. A scientist was expected to describe what happened
even when he disliked it
In a speech at the banquet of the Middlesex Bar
Association given in December of 1902, which he had
entitled, "Twenty Years in Retrospect," Holmes's own words
may hopefully guide us toward a better insight into his
legal philosophy:
I have tried to see the law as an organic whole. I 
also have tried to see it as a reaction between 
tradition on the one side and the changing desires 
and needs of the community on the other. I have 
studied tradition in order that I might understand 
how it came to be what it is, and to estimate its 
worth with regard to our present needs; and my 
references to the Year Books often have had a 
skeptical end.
I have considered the present tendencies and 
desires of society and have tried to realize that 
its different portions want different things, and 
that my business was to express not my personal 
wish, but the resultant, as nearly as I could 
guess, of the pressure of the past and the 
conflicting wills of the present.
I have considered the social and economic 
postulates on which we frame the conception of our 
needs, and I have to see them in dry light. It has 
seemed to me that certainty is an illusion, that 
we have few scientific data on which to affirm 
that one rule rather than another has the sanction 
of the universe, that we rarely could be sure that
36I d. at 31, p. 206
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one tends more distinctly than its opposite to the 
survival and welfare of the society where it is 
practiced, and that the wisest are but blind 
guides.
Studying Mr. Justice Holmes, the issue one must
continually confront is the fact that it is not always easy
to stand on political common ground with this man. His
prejudices were clearly his own, and it is not our interest
here to judge the rightness or wrongness of his point of
view on every issue.
If awareness is what we are after, then we must
recognize that his obvious sexism, his clear intellectual
elitism, his ties with an economic philosophy that would
conjoin industrial growth and the economic good of all are
not necessarily always one's own. The study of this
particular individual must relate more importantly to the
service he has rendered the development of American
jurisprudence. Holmes was the child of a period. The fin de
si eele that defined the later years of the 19th and the
early years of the 20th century was the intellectual milieu
that produced such an individual. It placed its imprint on
who and what he would become:
If our imagination is strong enough to accept the 
vision of ourselves as parts inseverable from the 
rest, and to extend our final interest beyond the 
boundary of our skins, it justifies the sacrifice 
even of our lives for ends outside of ourselves.
The motive, to be sure, is the common wants and
37 Icf. at 31. p. 151
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ideals that we find in man. Philosophy does not 
furnish motives, but it shows men that they are 
not fools for doing what they already want to do. 
It opens to the forlorn hopes on which we throw 
ourselves away, the vista of the farthest stretch 
of human thoughts, the chords of harmony that 
breathes from the unknown.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Natural Law," 32 Harvard Law 
Review, p. 40 (1918)
CHAPTER 4
FRANKFURTER, IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF HIS TEACHER
The year 1939 saw Franklin Roosevelt's nomination of 
Felix Frankfurter to fill the seat vacated by the death of 
Justice Cardozo. Joseph Lash tells us that in Frankfurter's 
account of his appointment he went to great lengths to 
portray himself as a man who was happy at Harvard, had no 
thought he might succeed Cardozo, and who, when in October 
was told by Franklin Roosevelt that he had promised the next 
appointment to West, accepted it in good spirits and 
objectively appraised for Roosevelt, as he had asked him to 
do, the qualifications of other men who were being 
proposed.^
Frankfurter had enjoyed a colorful political 
apprenticeship prior to his sudden choice by President 
Roosevelt. Hardly a newcomer to political life, he had 
served as personal assistant to Henry L. Stimson only a 
short time after being graduated by Harvard Law School in 
1906. This political "plum" was surely worthy of the still 
very young and brilliant attorney, but the route he had 
taken to that moment had been highly fortuitous.
1 Q" Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter. "A 
Biographical Essay" : Published by Joseph P. Lash, 1975. P. 63
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Born November 15, 1882 in the closing years of the 
Hapsburg Empire, Felix Frankfurter emigrated with his family 
to America in 1894. Jewish immigrants on New York's lower 
East Side confronted a world that was antithetical to the 
wealthy and prestigious Boston that had earlier nurtured 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. But Emma Frankfurter, his mother, 
tyrannized her husband Leopold and for many years had 
dominated her son. She had been determined that, despite 
Leopold's lack of business talent, the family would make it 
out of the ghetto and into the middle class. Within five 
years, the Frankfurters had moved uptown to Yorkville, and 
Frankfurter had discovered that academic achievement could 
provide him his own road toward upward mobility.^
A New York City public school education took 
Frankfurter next to City College in 1901, and from there to 
Harvard Law School. At Harvard he imbibed the spirit of John 
Gray's brand of legal skepticism, a precursor of what would 
later be called "legal realism." Holmes had argued as early 
as 1881 in his Lowell Lectures that the life of the law was 
experience, not logic, and Gray explored the various non- 
legal factors that affected judicial decision making.^
^Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter. Judicial Restraint and 
Individual Liberties (Boston:Twayne Publishers, 1991)
41I b i d P .  2
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As research assistant to John Chipman Gray, Frankfurter 
led his class for three years, made the Harvard Law Review, 
and was graduated in 1905, and it was a letter from Gray 
that introduced him to Oliver Wendell Holmes.^ The time he 
spent at Harvard established Frankfurter's sense of self, 
and gave him the opportunity to walk in the paths of a 
Brahman culture that affected the course of his future life, 
and H.N. Hirsch points out that the law as taught at Harvard 
would become the object of the judge's energies, as well as 
the root of his pride. They would become an immensely 
important source of his self esteem as well. Equally 
important, Harvard had offered an environment that allowed 
him to break the bounds of his culture and gain acceptance 
from the American establishment, which was thus far had been 
so foreign to him.^
The justice's short experience in private law practice 
ended only a year later when he joined Henry Stimson in the 
U.S. Attorney’s office in New York. Following Stimson to 
Washington in 1911, the young lawyer, not yet thirty, 
embarked upon personal notations in a diary that would 
record a life in law and public service that spanned the 
next half century.
4LH.N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (New York: Basic 
Books Inc., 1981) P.21
43 Ibid., P. 21
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Stimson, a representative of that "Yankee" culture
which Frankfurter had encountered at Harvard, became the
major touchstone for the judge's career. It was in
Washington where Frankfurter would develop a real
relationship with Oliver Wendell Holmes. In Harlan B.
Phillips compilation of recorded talks with Felix
Frankfurter, who was then a renowned Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, a highly significant piece of
personal memorabilia surfaces:
Apart from my own chief, Secretary Stimson, the 
great friendship I formed with a person of an 
older generation was Mr. Justice Holmes. I had a 
note of introduction to him from a great griend 
who was a professor of mine at the Harvard Law 
School. We soon became fast friends, and I became 
a regular visitor at his home. A regular visitor 
at his house meant that you sat in front of the 
fire when there was a fire, and sat in his study 
when there wasn't a fire, and he did practically 
all the talking. He was probably the best talker-- 
not the greatest talker in volume, but you just 
didn’t think of talking when he talked because it 
was such a wonderful stream of exciting flow of 
ideas in words.
In Washington, working closely with Stimson, then 
Secretary of War, Frankfurter suddenly found himself 
searching for a new path, when with the election of Woodrow 
Wilson in 1912, Stimson returned to private law practice.
Not enamored of practicing law, Frankfurter agreed to accept
^Harlen B. Phillips, Felix Frankfurter Reminisces (Reynal & 
Ccrrpany, Inc., 1960) P. 58
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a position on the faculty at Harvard, but the advent of the 
First World War changed his plans.
Harlan Phillips notes that when Frankfurter finally 
returned to Harvard in the fall of 1919, he was far
different from the man he'd been when he left. In 1917 he 
was still a "wunderkind," the bright young law school 
graduate who had been Mr. Stimson's assistant and was also 
well connected to the literary and political intellectuals 
of the House of Truth and The New Republic. Progressive 
politics had been a great "game" for Frankfurter. He had 
been a firsthand witness to the insidious bigotry directed 
at suspected radicals and the hatred between labor and 
management. Having been not only an aide to the Secretary of 
War, but an important figure in his own right in an effort 
to mobilize American resources for the war, Frankfurter had 
been an eyewitness to the drama at Paris and had played a 
key role in moving the Zionist dream closer to reality. The 
young man from the "other side" had been tested under very 
trying circumstances and had succeeded brilliantly in his 
efforts.^
Back at Harvard in 1919, Felix Frankfurter continued to 
be anything but politically indifferent. Bridging the gap 
between the conservatism of his Brahman idols and the
^ Supra, Note 40., P. 19
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liberalism of those who adamantly defended Sacco and 
Vanzetti, we find here a man who in the years preceding his 
selection to serve on the United States Supreme Court 
maintained a stance which kept him "balancing" between these 
two ideological positions.
Although he recognized that the system could be 
perverted by the abuse of prosecutorial and judicial power, 
Frankfurter never abandoned his faith in its essential 
rightness. Despite the charges of his supposed radicalism, 
Frankfurter's basic conservatism is clear. Only by clinging 
to the law as an instrument of reason and justice could 
society be saved from the turmoil of prejudice and 
revolution.^
As a man who was student, teacher and inevitably maker 
of law, Felix Frankfurter during the 1920's developed a 
legal point of view that would find its fullest development 
in the years he spent on the Supreme Court. Frankfurter like 
Holmes rejected a formalistic, mechanical approach to the 
law. He didn't see law as a fixed body of eternal verities, 
but as a set of ideas responding to the changing times.
The legal realists had taught him that judges respond as men 
rather than machines in determining the law, and the 
conservative bloc of the Supreme Court showed him how 
dangerous this response could be.
46Ibid., P. 25
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Brandeis had also influenced Frankfurter's commitment to law 
as an agency of reform--but always operating in conjunction 
with the elective bodies and in accordance with the 
essential principles of the Constitution.^
Archibald Mac Leish spends considerable time speaking 
of the relationship enjoyed by Frankfurter and Holmes. 
According to this author, there were two men who most 
influenced the thinking of Felix Frankfurter, and they were 
Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Speaking 
specifically of Holmes, Mac Leish's words provide a 
wonderful insight into the Justice's philosophy and help the 
reader to recognize that important thread which ultimately 
bound Frankfurter to his renowned predecessor. He says that 
with Frankfurter, and with others of equal exuberance of 
mind and emotion, the influence of Mr. Justice Holmes was a 
"sovereign prescription." Holmes had seen the law, as few 
great jurists have ever seen it. He was capable of 
understanding its relationship to a world which included men 
and women, poetry, work and war. He saw the pretensions of 
the law to final precision as skeptically as he saw the 
pretensions of philosophers to ultimate truth or the 
pretensions of politicians to disinterested service.
And therefore, he conceived of, taught and argued that the 
law--even the law of the Constitution--must make its own
47 Ibid., P. 32
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adjustments to its time. What Holmes had given his friends, 
and Mr. Frankfurter among them, was a conception of the law 
as anything but a means to an end. To most great lawyers the 
law sooner or later becomes a substantive, a noun. For Mr. 
Justice Holmes it was always a verb with a predicate to 
fol 1 ow it
G. Edward White, in his extensive examination of that 
tradition which has been carried forward by American 
jurisprudence, spends considerable time with his study of 
Justice Frankfurter. Clearly not always portraying his 
subjects with great admiration, White's examination of the 
members of the Warren Court notes their sensitivity to the 
implications of status, and one is made aware of that 
intellectual elitism which Frankfurter may well have carried 
away from his early days in front of Mr. Justice Holmes's 
fire.
Frankfurter had been able to reconcile his intellectual 
elitism with the idea of democracy using notions of 
paternalism and social responsibility. He obviously believed 
that the masses needed the opportunity to achieve elite 
status, but that they could only recognize these 
opportunities if educated by an elite. Public-mindedness was 
the obligation that must accompany one's rise in the
^ Law and Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter 1912- 
1938. Edited by Archibald MacLeish and E.F. Prichard, Jr., with a 
Foreword by Mr. Mac Leish., P. xviii
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meritocracy. He was representative of a group of early 
twentieth-century thinkers who called themselves 
"progressives" and who thought that popular sovereignty and 
elitism were as easily reconcilable as humanitarianism and 
professionalism. Progressivism had its greatest meaning for 
Frankfurter predicated upon his concern that elites use 
their privileged status to further rather than block mass 
participation in education and politics. Out of this concern 
had come his conception of the limited role of the Supreme 
Court. i9
The 1930s were years in which Felix Frankfurter found 
himself involved in both the intellectual life of the law at 
Harvard, as well as with New Deal politics in Washington. As 
a professor, he became mentor to James Landis, Alger Hiss, 
Charles Wyzanski, Thomas Corcoran and others, students who 
he would send to Washington to be part of the Roosevelt 
administration. His relationship with Roosevelt had spanned 
the early years of the twentieth century, and H.N. Hirsch 
writes that Frankfurter had first come to know Roosevelt 
when both were middle level functionaries in Washington 
during World War I. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, often discussed labor matters with Frankfurter, 
who was chairman of the War Labor Policies Board.
Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of 
Leading American Judges (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988) P. 326-327
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Frankfurter later said--perhaps with a touch of 
exaggeration--that they saw or spoke to each other nearly 
every day in 1917 and 1918.^
In 1930, Professor Frankfurter had written to Walter 
Lipmann that he would support Roosevelt in his effort toward 
becoming president.^ And in Max Freedman's remarkable 
compilation of the correspondence between Felix Frankfurter 
and Franklin Roosevelt one may draw some real insight into 
the relationship that these two men shared. Freedman 
includes a telegram dated June 19, 1930, in which 
Frankfurter explained to Roosevelt why he had to decline 
Governor Ely of Massachusetts's offer to serve on the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts. Clearly, Frankfurter had 
other ideas about his potentialities, and history would 
provide the result.
What emerges here is not only the definitive importance 
Roosevelt found in Frankfurter's advice, but also the 
position Professor Frankfurter held as intermediary between 
the President and Justice Louis Brandeis, another vital 
center of influence for Frankfurter's legal philosophy. The 
then prestigious Harvard professor of the law wanted to pull 
the Roosevelt administration toward the position of what has
Supra Note 42., P. 101
to Lippmann, quoted in Freedman, Roosevelt and Frankfurter.
P. 56
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been referred to as Brandeisian liberalism. Walter Lippman 
has said that:
Brandeis held an almost mystical aura for 
Frankurter and, especially, for Frankfurter's 
proteges... They perceived the New Deal as a chance 
to finally bring about some of the reforms for 
which they had all struggled since the turn of the 
century... The ideological core of Brandeisian 
liberalism was its emphasis on smallness...they 
sought to restore the simple and decentralized 
market economy of the nineteenth century...To the 
first New Dealers, business was to be a partner; 
to the Brandeisians business was to be the 
enemy.
Reading the correspondence between Frankfurter and 
Roosevelt, it becomes even more evident that Frankfurter 
maintained a central role as advisor to President Roosevelt 
before, during and after Roosevelt's move into the 
presidency.
In May of 1935, on the heels of the Supreme Decision in 
Schecter. Frankfurter recognized that the first New Deal at 
the hands of the then sitting Supreme Court would 
necessitate a real shift in Roosevelt's policies. Although 
he disagreed with the President's plan to "pack the Court," 
Frankfurter maintained his loyalty to Roosevelt, so much so 
that he stayed silent and took an active part in Roosevelt's 
campaign for re-election. Philosophically he disagreed with 
the President's methodology, but the relationship they 
shared was far more significant for Frankfurter. H.N. Hirsch
^ Supra Note 42., P. 104
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suggests that the Justice's nomination to the Supreme Court 
of the United States was in a sense a reward for his loyalty
C9during the Court-packing fight.
Melvin Urofsky offers an extremely interesting view as 
it relates to the perspective Frankfurter brought to his new 
position as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. As Frankfurter had taught a generation of students 
at Harvard how they might see the appropriate role of the 
Supreme Court and the limits of its jurisdiction as well, he 
would go on to attempt to teach his breathren on the Court. 
For 30 years, however, Frankfurter had been either an 
acolyte of men like Holmes, Brandeis, Stimson, and 
Roosevelt--or a mentor himself to those he considered his 
intellectual inferiors.
The sitting Court when Frankfurter came to it was not 
interested in necessarily following his line of thought. One 
of the great tragedies of Frankfurter's career is that a man 
renowned for his talents in personal relations, could have 
so misread the situation and the characters of those with 
whom he would serve.^
^ Sî pra Note 42, P. 124 
^ Supra Note 40., P. 46
CHAPTER 5
FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE DEFINITION OF AN IDEOLOGY 
Both Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes came 
to the Supreme Court in their mature years. Each of them had 
developed conclusive opinions as to the place the Court must 
hold in American life. Frankfurter was fifty-seven when in 
1939 he assumed his seat on the most prestigious bench in 
the American legal system.
A scholar by anyone's standards, Frankfurter had 
clearly made his mark as a pre-eminent professor of the law. 
Also a man of politics, here was a new justice who had for 
many years found both his hands and mind deeply entrenched 
in the workings of American politics. As Franklin 
Roosevelt's friend and advisor, he was, although he often 
denied it, an important cog in the wheels of New Deal 
dynamics, and not unlike Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who's 
words he so often quoted, Frankfurter represented an 
apparent plus for the policies espoused by the different 
"Rooseveltian" administration he had been chosen to serve. 
The professor who left Harvard for the bench in 1939 was 
generally considered a liberal (in some quarters even a 
radical). From that point on, for many he became the voice 
of conservatism. If in fact the apparent change occurred,
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its impact upon history was profound. What is significant,
however, is that Frankfurter's basic outlook did not change.
In private life he was, and continued to be one of the great
liberals of his day. But it was integral to his philosophy
that a judge's private convictions are one thing, his duty
on the bench quite another. This was the teaching of Holmes.
As a professor or a judge, whether with respect to liberty
or property, Felix Frankfurter was skeptical of government
by the judiciary.^
In his writings prior to the January day that he
received the telephone call from Franklin Roosevelt which
would effect the balance of his life, Frankfurter's words
corroborate a belief that he had already arrived at his own
view of the place the Supreme Court must hold in America's
constitutional system. In 1925 he wrote:
The real battles of liberalism are not won on the 
Supreme Court. To a large extent the Supreme 
Court, under the guise of Constitutional 
interpretation of words whose contents are derived 
from the disposition of the justices, is the 
reflection of that impalpable but controlling 
thing, the general drift of public opinion. Only a 
persistent positive translation of the liberal 
faith into the thoughts and acts of the community 
is the real reliance against the unabated 
temptation to straight jacket the human mind. 1’
^Wallace Mendel son, Felix Frankfurter A Tribute (New York:Reynal 
& Company, 1964) P. 1-2
^Felix Frankfurter,’’Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?” 
New Republic, 17 June 1925. P. 178
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In his prologue to The Antagonists. James F. Simon 
speaks of the response to Justice Frankfurter's nomination 
to the Court. This author notes that according to the New 
York Times, both liberal Democrats and anti-New Deal 
Republicans alike ranked him as one of FDR's most popular
C7appointments. As it turned out, the conservatives were more 
prescient in their forecast than the liberals, for 
Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial restraint proved to be 
his pervasive guide, and his record on civil liberties, so 
exemplary as a private citizen, would be less impressive as 
a justice.
Ironically, the former member of the Ku Klux Klan, Hugo 
Black, would become the libertarian hero and liberal leader 
of the Court--not Frankfurter. In January 1939, the focus 
was exclusively on Frankfurter, who, appropriately, was 
taking the scholar's seat on the Court, filed by Cardozo and 
Holmes before him. Like his predecessors, Frankfurter shared 
with Holmes (who had been his close friend and mentor) a 
view of the law as a living, vital force that must change 
with the times.^ ■
C7
James F. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter 
and Civil Liberties in America (New York:Simon & Schuster, 1989) P. 17
88 Ibid., P. 18
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Once again, Frankfurter's views as they related to the
function of the Supreme Court and the place of law in modern
society were well defined in his tribute to Justice Jackson:
That law in its comprehending sense is at once the 
precondition and, perhaps, the greatest 
achievement of an enduring civilization since 
without it there is either strife or enslavement 
of the spirit of man; that law so conceived 
expresses the enforceable insights of morality and 
endeavors of justice, that law is not word- 
jugglery or the manipulation of symbols; that 
precedents, while not foreclosing new truths or 
enlarged understanding, are not counters to be 
moved about for pre-conceived ends; that this 
significance and role of aw must particularly be 
respected in a continental federal society like 
ours.
The Supreme Court as the ultimate voice of the law 
must always be humbly mindful of the fact that it 
is entrusted with power which is saved from misuse 
only by a self-searching disinterestedness almost 
beyond the lot of men--these were convictions 
Justice Jackson passionately entertained."
For Frankfurter, and as he so often enunciated, the
Supreme Court was to serve as only interpreter and protector
of social policy. Although the positions he took would in
certain instances be politically controversial, he brought
to the Court an ever present awareness of the limits of his
position.
Judicial restraint in his hands meant that the 
country's best hope for the protection of its democratic 
values lay with the elected branches of government, not with
^Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Jackscm. " Harvard Law Review, 
LXVIII (April, 1955, P. 937-938
50
the Supreme Court. That "disinterestedness" which he had 
admired in Jackson was surely his chosen credo. Wallace 
Mendelson has characterized Justice Frankfurter in much the 
same mode when he says that he was wary of judicial attempts 
to impose justice on the community. This was to deprive it 
of the wisdom that comes from self-inflicted wounds and the 
strength that grows with the burden of responsibility. In 
the Justice's view, humanitarian ends were served best in 
that allocation of function through which people by balance 
of power seek their own destiny. True to the faith upon 
which democracy ultimately rested, Frankfurter would leave 
to the political processes the onus of building legal 
standards. In the Justice's view, only that people is free 
who chooses for itself when choices must be made.®
In 1916, in an essay written for the Harvard Law 
Review, Frankfurter paid tribute to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
and to his mentor's perception of the position of the 
Supreme Court. The essay was full of Holmes's words, and in 
quoting the man he so obviously admired, Frankfurter 
provided an evocation of his own jurisprudencial philosophy:
We touch here the most sensitive spot in our 
constitutional system: that its successful working 
calls for minds of extraordinary intellectual. 
disinterestedness and penetration lest limitations 
in personal experience and imagination be
^Wallace Mendelson, Justices Black and Frankfurter:Conflict On 
The Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) P. 130-131
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interpreted, however conscientiously or 
unconsciously, as constitutional limitations.61
And then, quoting Justice Holmes directly, Frankfurter
wrote:
Great constitutional provisions must be 
administered with caution. Some play must be 
allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must 
be remembered that legislatures are ultimate 
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the 
people in quite as great a degree as the courts.62
Although social responsibility remained the core of
Frankfurter's personal ideology, there may well be a clear
connection between his views as they related to the place of
the Court and the lack of uniformity that often pervaded his
judicial opinions. Neither a categorical realist or a
formalist in the sense either is commonly understood,
Frankfurter commingled the two perspectives, leaving to the
Court the job of serving as the moderating voice between the
public and their representatives. The essence of his
judicial restraint maintained that it was not the province
of the Court to make social policy:
In a democracy the legislative impulse and its 
expression should come from those popularly chosen 
to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as 
courts are not. The pressure on legislatures to 
discharge their responsibility with care, 
understanding and imagination should be stiffened, 
not relaxed. Above all, they must not be 
encouraged in irresponsible or undisciplined use
^ Felix Frankfurter, "The Constitutional Opinions of Justice 
Holmes, " Harvard Law Review, 1916, P. 686
621;bid., P. 686
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of language. In the keeping of legislatures 
perhaps more than any other group is the well­
being of their fellow-men.
Frankfurter's appointment to the Court was confirmed 
without a dissenting vote on January 17, and on January 30, 
1939, he took his oath to "administer justice without 
respect to person." These words echo with a special clarity 
as they refer to the Judge, but it is in his most 
significant opinions where we must look in search of 
corroboration for his faithfulness to their essential 
meaning.
Helen Shirley Thomas suggests that we view Justice 
Frankfurter through his own words as well, "As Frankfurter 
wrote in 1931, 'for all of us, truth is born when we 
discover it. But intellectual genealogy is important.
The history of ideas is essential to culture; thereby we are 
saved from being intellectually nouveau riches.'^
But can we discover the "truth" of Felix Frankfurter? 
Perhaps it will not be possible to categorize this man who 
has been such a disappointment for some and a definitive 
example of judicial accomplishment for others. In 1975, a 
reviewer of J, Lash's book, From The Diaries of Felix
£5
Felix Frankfurter, "Same Reflections an the Reading of 
Statutes," Columbia Law Review, May, 1947, P. 545-546
^Helen Shirley Thorns, Felix Frankfurter Scholar On The Bench. 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960) P. 40
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Frankfurter presented the former view. For the writer,
Frankfurter had surely been a disappointment:
In light of Felix Frankfurter's brilliant pre- 
Court career, what did the country--and 
Frankfurter himself--expect from him on the bench?
What were his role and accomplishments on the 
Court? Given Frankfurter's early liberalism, could 
one have foreseen, and can we now explain, his 
later shift to conservatism? Is there a consistent 
philosophical thread between the younger 
Frankfurter and the Justice?.. Frankfurter's 
unusual combination of scholarship and activism 
should have made him a dominating figure on the 
Supreme Court, and one who in a period of stress, 
would protect the rights of political and 
religious minorities. But neither occurred.
Instead, Frankfurter emerged as the paradigm 
rationalist, the academics' Justice. His primary 
concerns were with regularity, neutrality, and 
judicial humility. He deferred to administrative 
expertise, the political processes, and stare 
decisis..
One must wonder whether the man who had served as 
counsel to the NAACP and as an active participant in the 
activities of the American Civil Liberties.Union, as well as 
the person who had written the inflammatory book, The Case 
of Sacco and Vanzetti. in 1927, actually remained the 
defender of civil liberties and the passionate devotee of 
liberal causes. Was that pre-Court political position which 
appeared to characterize Professor Felix Frankfurter 
contradicted by his behavior on the bench, or were the 
opinions rendered by this enigmatic Supreme Court Justice
^ Leonard Boudin, Book Review, 89 Harv. L.Rev. 282 (1975) 
(reviewing J. Lash, Fran The Diaries of Felix Frankfurter. 1975), P. 
284-285
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part of an ideological metamorphosis he underwent as he 
reflected on the appropriate position of the Supreme Court 
over a lifetime as both student and teacher of law?
In his dissent in Baker v Carr, Frankfurter's obvious 
concern that the Supreme Court had just suffered a "self 
inflicted wound" comparable only to Dred Scott, indicated 
his awareness of the potential danger of its misuse of 
power:
...Such a massive repudiation of the experience of 
our whole past in asserting destructively novel 
judicial power demands a detailed analysis of the 
role of this court in our constitutional scheme. 
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective 
exercise of the Court's "Judicial Power" not only 
presages the futility of judicial intervention in 
the essentially political conflict of forces by 
which the relation between population and 
representation has time out of mind been and now 
is determined.
It may well impair the Court’s position as the 
ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the Land' in 
that vast range of legal problems, often strongly 
entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court 
must pronounce.
The Court's authority--possessed of neither the 
purse nor the sword--ultimately rests on sustained 
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such 
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete 
detachment, and by abstention from injecting 
itself into the clash of political forces in 
political settlements.
It is therefore to the most memorable of his decisions 
that we must turn, attempting to hopefully better come to 
terms with the jurisprudence of Felix Frankfurter. Both he
6'6369 U.S. at 267.
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and his mentor Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. appear to have
remained faithful to a specific point of view as it relates
to the responsibilities of a Supreme Court justice.
Perhaps in acknowledging what for both men was a
necessary dichotomy between his political preferences and
the responsibilities of a Supreme Court judge we will find
an answer to the contradictory nature of much of their
decision making.
Louis Jaffee, at the time, Dean of the University of
Buffalo Law School, spoke of "the judicial universe" of
Felix Frankfurter. Holmes definitely was not a liberal, and
neither was his disciple, Frankfurter, whose judicial
philosophy was so consciously inspired by the elder judge.
Neither of these men could be relied upon to deliver a
judgement because it immediately implemented some accepted
tenet of the liberal legislative program.
Justice Frankfurter was in this sense no more
conservative than he was liberal. It is the very essence of
his judicial philosophy that his role on the Court precluded
him from having a program predicated upon a political point 
67of view. Whether in fact his performance as a justice 
confirmed such a belief is arguable.
^ Louis L. Jaffe, "The Judicial {Adverse of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter," 62 Harvard Law Review (1949) P. 358
CHAPTER 6 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: FREE SPEECH,
CONSISTENCY OR CHANGE IN HIS LEGAL PHILOSOPHY?
Any attempt to understand the basic philosophy that 
underlies the jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes must 
include an examination of his free speech decisions. Some of 
his most eloquent and telling words may be found in those 
opinions he rendered concerning this vital issue. It is also 
here where a clearer picture of the motivations which 
underscored his career on the Supreme Court may hopefully 
emerge. Max Lerner has written that Holmes's opinions in the 
civil liberties cases gave occasion to some of his most 
moving utterances. In this area he was writing with love and 
without the sense of inhibition he had felt when dealing 
with technical economic problems. Here, in dealing with the 
relation of state power to individual intellectual freedom, 
Holmes concerned himself with a subject on which Plato, 
Milton, Mill, Bagehot and others had given of their best 
energies. It was a subject which as it dealt with states 
rights was the most difficult and the most challenging. If 
there was one job which he was best able to confront, by 
reason of preparation and his deepest nature, it was the 
issue of freedom of speech.
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He brought to it on the one hand a solicitude for individual 
expression and also a toughness of mind which saw the 
survival of the state as a condition that came of the 
creativeness of individuals within it.® (*my italics)
Holmes rendered his first Supreme Court opinion dealing 
with the issue of freedom of speech in the case of Patterson
enV. Colorado. This case concerned an editor in Colorado who 
had published articles and a cartoon allegedly "reflecting 
on the motives and conduct of the (judges of) the Supreme 
Court of Colorado in cases still pending."^7 The editor in 
question was convicted of contempt, and appealed his 
conviction on the basis that "to fine or imprison an accused 
person in contempt proceedings for publishing the truth 
about a judge or a court when the truth of the charge is 
pleaded in justification... is to deprive him of liberty and 
property without due process of law."7-7
Choosing to disregard the defendant's allusion to the 
Due Process Clause, which he had assumed incorporated the 
First Amendment to the Constitution, the basis for Holmes's 
decision was that the First Amendment merely codified the 
law of criminal libel. He argued that, "the main purpose of
^ Supra Note 6, P. 289
69 205 U.S. 454 (1907)
70 Id at 459.
77 Id. at 456. Patterson had not stipulated that he was appealing 
an the basis of the First Amendment, assuming that it was incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
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such constitutional provisions is to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced
by other governments, and they did not prevent the
subsequent punishment of such as deemed contrary to the
public welfare."
Patterson claimed a right to comment about public
trials and the judges who decided them, also that the
statements about the corrupt and partisan motives of
Colorado judges were true, and offered to prove their 
7?truth. But the Justice was not concerned with the truth or
falsity of Patterson's claims. His opinion in this case
related directly to Blackstonian Common Law, in which he
argued, "the preliminary freedom extends as well to the
false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend
as well to the true as to the false." This was the law of
criminal libel apart from statute in most cases, if not in 
7?all. The essence of Holmes's position was -that the state of 
Colorado had the right to decide that it was not in the 
public welfare for persons to make statements about the 
conduct or motives of judges, and it could if it so chose, 
treat these statements as criminal libels.
11 Id. at 461. 
73 Id. at 462.
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According to G. Edward White, the combination of the 
'prior restraints' limitation on First Amendment claims and 
the 'bad tendency' test announced as an evaluative standard 
for 'police power'limitations on free speech made Holmes' 
Patterson opinion a very restrictive one. Under its 
reasoning a state could suppress even true speech if it 
concluded that the words had a tendency to promote socially 
injurious acts.
Eight years after Patterson Holmes again advanced a
restrictive theory of freedom of speech in a Supreme Court
case, once more sanctioning the use of 'bad tendencies' as a
74justification for subsequent punishment of speech. The "bad 
tendency test" of which White speaks is that barometer which 
judges had used to analyze free speech issues. It derived 
from the English common law of libel as synthesized by 
Blackstone before the American Revolution. The test 
determined to measure the legality of speech by its tendency 
to cause an illegal action. The case referred to here is 
that of Fox v Washington.^
The petitioner in Fox was an editor of a magazine in 
which an article had appeared that discussed the 
infiltration into a nudist group of "a few prudes," who 
"proceeded in the brutal, unneighborly way of the outside
G.Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:Law and the Inner 
Self, (New York:Oxford University Press, 1993) P.351
75236 U.S. 273 (1915)
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world to suppress the people's freedom," and ultimately had
four members of the group arrested for indecent exposure.^
The article in question called for a boycott of the "prudes"
businesses, saying that "the boycott will be pushed until
these invaders will come to see the brutal mistake of their
77action and so inform the people.
The editor of the article had been prosecuted under a 
state statute, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, it was held that the article was "not a 
criticism of the law, but was calculated to, and did, incite 
the violation of the law." In addition, it noted that the 
right of free speech did not mean "that persons may with
70impunity advocate disregard of law."
Holmes's opinion stated that, "we understand the state
court by implication at least to have read the statute as
confined to encouraging an actual breach of law." and it
does not appear and is not likely that the statute will be
construed to prevent publications merely because they tend
to produce unfavorable opinions of a particular statute or
of law in general." (*my italics)He further argued that "the
disrespect for law that was encouraged was disregard of it--
79an overt breach and technically criminal act." And beyond
11 Id. at 276-77 
73 Id.
79 Id. at 277.
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this, that "by indirection but unmistakably, the article 
encouraged and incited a persistence in what we must assume 
would be a breach of the state laws against indecent 
exposure.
There is no doubt that in both Fox and Patterson,
Holmes had taken a stance consistent with his reliance on 
the validity of English Common Law jurisprudence. He had 
begun his free speech decision making by underlining the 
basic power of state legislatures to suppress speech if in 
fact such speech had a tendency to encourage or incite the 
commission of a crime. His opinion in Schenck. which was 
delivered some four years later, bore, with its statement of 
the "clear and present danger" test, a distinct similarity 
to the philosophical position he had taken in these two 
earlier free speech decisions. Although the circumstances of 
the decision were different, Holmes chose once again to rely 
on both the issues of inciting disregard of the law, as well
as those "bad tendencies" to which he had alluded earlier.
01The decision in Schenck v. United States was rendered 
in the context of anti World War I sentiment, and although 
the issue of free speech was once more at issue, the 
aftershock of Holmes's opinion would reverberate on into the 
the 20th century. Schenck and Baer had been indicted on 
three counts of violating the Espionage Act of 1917:
81249 U.S. 47 (1919)
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conspiracy to cause insubordination in the military and to 
obstruct the recruitment and enlistment; conspiracy to use 
the mails in violation of the Espionage Act; and the offense 
of using the mails unlawfully.
The evidence that was presented included minutes of a
meeting of the executive committee of the Socialist Party in
which a plan had been authorized that Schenck, the
secretary, prepare and publish a circular that condemned the
draft. In addition, there was testimony that Schenck did
order the publication of the circulars. Also entered into
evidence was a pile of the circulars that had been found at
the party headquarters, as well as newspaper clippings of
names of men who had already received their draft notices;
the Post Office's discovery of a number of the circulars in
the mail posted to men whose names had appeared on the list,
and the testimony of several men who had notified the postal
89authorities that they had received circulars. The jury 
convicted the defendants on all counts, and the judge 
sentenced them to ten years on each count, though the 
sentences were to be served concurrently.
After his conviction, Schenck appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, questioning the constitutionality of the 
Espionage Act on First Amendment grounds. In the Schenck 
appeal, the Court ruled unanimously to uphold the act in 
question, and Justice Holmes chose to say "a few words"
^See Record at 17-62 Schenck.
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about it. The words of his opinion must surely help to
better explicate his position in the case:
But it is said, suppose that that was the tendency 
of this circular, it is protected by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution. Two of the 
strongest expressions are said to be quoted 
respectively from well known public men.
It well may be that the prohibition of laws 
abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to 
previous restraints, although to prevent them may 
have been the main purpose. We admit that in many 
places and in ordinary times the defendants, in 
saying all that was said in the circular, would 
have been within their constitutional rights. But 
the character of every act depends upon the 
circumstances in which it is done.
The most stringent protection of free speech would 
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a 
theater, and causing a panic. It does not even 
protect a man from an injunction against uttering 
words that may have all the effect of force. The 
question in every case is whether the words used 
are used in such circumstances as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has the 
right to prevent... The Statute of 1917, in 4, 
punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as 
actual obstruction. If the act (speaking, or 
circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent 
with which it is done, are the same, we perceive 
no ground for saying that success alone warrants 
making the act a crime... (*my italics)
Certain issues surrounding the rationale for Holmes's
opinion have been raised. H.L. Pohlman has argued that
according to Holmes's theory of liability, if persons had
conspired to do something unlawful, that sufficed for a
84conviction. No proximity of harm was required.
33 Id at 52.
3̂ G. Eduard White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Free Speech and 
the Living Constitution (New York: New York University Press, 1991) P.
66
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David Rabban has responded that the language of clear 
and present danger should be ignored. We would better look 
at a sentence that appears later in Holmes's opinion in the 
case. Rabban argues that after Holmes had commented that the 
existence of war was relevant to the question of Schenck's 
liability, in the next sentence he had recurred to the 'bad
ACtendency doctrine'.
Pohlman's response to Rabban's position is that 
Holmes's opinion that Schenck was guilty didn't necessarily 
make him an adherent of the bad tendency doctrine. He says 
that an act, its tendency and the intent with which it is
done are in fact the same for Holmes. In other words, if
they are illegal or harmful, then in his view liability
could be imposed even if the harm did not occur. All that
Holmes said, in Pohlman's view, was that conspiring with 
others was an act whose tendency and accompanying intent 
were harmful. Accordingly, liability could be imposed on
aepersons who conspired to obstruct the draft through speech.
Holmes treated conspiracy differently when speech was 
the primary means that the conspirators used to reach their 
objective. Perhaps the justice thought that liability could 
be imposed only if the group's purpose was unlawful and only 
if the planned speech activity had a reasonable chance of
fl c
David Rabban, "The Emergence of Modem First Amendment Doctrine" 
50 University of Chicago Law Review (1983), P. 1261.
86 Ibid P. 68.
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causing harm, and liability was appropriate in this case
simply because the defendant's speech had been effective
enough to make the group illegal.
In The Common Law, at Page 35, in Holmes's discussion
of early forms of liability may well be found a
foreshadowing of the rationale he had used here:
On the other hand, in substance the growth of the 
law s legislative. And this in a deeper sense than 
that what the courts declare to have always been 
the law is in fact new. It is legislative in its 
grounds. The very considerations which judges most 
rarely mention, and always with an apology, are 
the secret root from which the law draws all the 
juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations 
of what is expedient for the community concerned. 
Every important principle which is developed by 
litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of 
more or less definitely understood views of public 
policy; most generally, to be sure, under our 
practice and traditions, the unconscious result of 
instinctive preferences and inarticulate 
convictions, but none the less traceable to views 
of public policy in the last analysis. (*my 
italics)
Holmes had chosen the terms "new reasons more fitted to 
the times" in the same context, and had clearly articulated 
those "instinctive preferences and traditions" which so 
influenced his own legal thought.
ogIn the case of Debs v United States , in a unanimous 
opinion Holmes wrote for the Court, White will argue that 
here was still another opportunity to apply his "attempts"
87 Ibid., P. 69.
88 Supra Note 34, Page 35.
89 2 49 U.S. 211 (1919)
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analogy. This had been the "cause celebre" of the Espionage 
Act cases. It was the case in which Eugene Debs, the 
Socialist Party candidate for President in 1912 was 
convicted of obstructing the war effort on the basis of a 
speech he made at the Socialists' convention. Several 
particulars of Debs' speech had been made the basis of a 
criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act. Debs had 
alluded in this speech, according to the evidence presented, 
to a visit that he had made to three 'loyal comrades' who 
were serving time in the workhouse for 'aiding and abetting 
another in failing to register for the draft'. The logic of 
Holmes' approach to criminal attempts applied easily to 
Deb's acts. Holmes had maintained that the acts in question 
raised the possibility that the purpose of the speech, 
whether incidental or not did not matter. It was meant to 
oppose not only war in general but this war, and that 
opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended
Meffect would be to obstruct recruiting.
Holmes's words stipulated that the jury was warranted
in its conviction, and in his judgment:
...finding that one purpose of speech, whether 
incidental or not does not matter, was to oppose 
not only war in general, but this war, and that 
the opposition was so expressed that its natural 
and intended effect would be to obstruct 
recruiting. If that was intended, and if, in all 
the circumstances, that would be its probable 
effect, it would not be protected by reason of its
^ Supra Note 74, P. 420.
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being part of a general program and expression of 
a general and conscientious belief.
It does, nonetheless, seem appropriate that we consider 
here a letter which Holmes sent to Harold Laski on March 16, 
1919. Refering here to Debs. Holmes wrote:
Dear Laski,
...I sent you yesterday some opinions in the 
(Eugene) Debs and other similar cases (including 
Schenk). I greatly regretted having to write them- 
-and (between ourselves) that the government 
pressed them to a hearing. Of course I know that 
donkeys and knaves would represent us as 
concurring in the condemnation of Debs because he 
was a dangerous agitator. Of course, too, so far 
as that is concerned, he might split his guts 
without my interfering with him or sanctioning 
interference. But on the only questions before us 
I could not doubt about the law.
The federal judges seem to me (again between 
ourselves) to have got hysterical about the war. I 
should think the President when he gets through 
with his present amusements might do some 
pardoning. I have been interrupted and so perhaps 
have been less coherent than I should have been.
The period in which this letter was written undoubtedly 
was far from normal. The issues with which the Supreme Court 
had to deal must be considered, according to Holmes, in 
"light of the circumstances."
It is worth noting that there is a strong similarity in 
the circumstances which surrounded the decisions Oliver 
Wendell Holmes would render during the time of the First 
World War and comparable choices Felix Frankfurter would
91 StS>ra Note 89, 211, 214-214
9̂ As quoted in Hie Essential Holmes, ed. Richard Posner, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) P. 316.
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make in another period of American history. It is yet to be 
determined whether the basic philosophy upon which 
Frankfurter predicated such choices was very different from 
that which had motivated Holmes more than twenty years 
earlier.
Although both Schenck and Debs are more often discussed
in this particular vein, the case of Frohwerk v Uni ted 
93States was in actuality the second in line of the espionage
cases. It is significant because it stands as part of what
it is believed by many to be an important period of
transition in the free speech philosophy of Holmes.
Frohwerk. like Schenck, involved an alleged conspiracy, no
actual danger of harm was required here, and Holmes
apparently did not refer back to the "clear and present
danger" doctrine in his decision.
The defendant's conviction on conspiracy and eleven
counts of attempts to cause insubordination, and refusal of
duty elicited the following response from Holmes:
...conspiracy to obstruct recruiting would be 
criminal even if no means were agreed upon 
specifically by which to accomplish the intent. It 
is enough if the parties agreed to set to work for 
that common purpose... the Court had to take the 
case on the record as it is, and on the record it 
is impossible to say that it might not have been 
found that the circulation of the paper was in 
quarters where a little breath would be enough to 
kindle a flame and that the fact was known and 
relied upon by those who sent the paper out.
93249 U.S. 204 (1919) 
94 Id at 204, 209
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In all of the espionage cases, Holmes refused to 
protect conspiracies to obstruct recruiting or to cause 
insubordination in the military. The issue here was not 
whether the unlawful goals were to be obtained by speech or
if there was no clear immediate danger of harm. In this
instance conspiracy spoke for itself, and in Lecture II of
The Common Law, Holmes took a most telling position as it
related to the context of this discussion:
...probably most English-speaking lawyers would 
accept the preventive theory without hesitation.
As to the violation of equal rights which is 
charged, it may be replied that the dogma of 
equality makes an equation between individuals 
only, not between an individual and the community.
No society has ever admitted that it could not 
sacrifice individual welfare to its own 
existence ... because no civilized government 
sacrifices the citizens more than it can help, but 
still sacrificing his will and his welfare to that 
of the rest... public policy sacrifices the 
individual to the general good...when we are 
dealing with that part of the law which aims more 
directly than any other at establishing standards 
of conduct, we should expect there more than 
elsewhere to find that the tests of liability are 
external, and independent of the degree of evil in 
the particular person's motives or intentions...
(*my italics)
It is around the question of whether public policy can 
sacrifice the rights of the individual to the general good 
that Alexander Meikeljohn has built an argument which is 
very critical of Holmes and his "clear and present danger 
doctrine." Meikeljohn underlines the highly threatening 
character of Holmes's phrase. He points to the dominating 
influence it has had on our understanding of self
^ Supra Note 34, P. 43,44,49,51
government. 1 Even opening the discussion of free speech to 
the question of whether it does or does not have the 
potential for harm has in fact "led to the annulment of the 
First Amendment rather than its interpretation."^7
One must ask, as does Professor Meiklejohn, "What is 
the line, the principle, which marks off those speech 
activities which are liable to legislative abridgment from 
those which, under the Constitution, the legislature is
netforbidden to regulate or to suppress?" For him, there is no 
rational manner in which we can allow suppression of speech 
on one ground and allow it on another. The very act of 
pointing to specific instances where free speech is 
unallowable is in fact erroneous, "the distinction between 
speech-actions and speech-thoughts is not, then, the 
distinction which we need for the proper interpretation of 
the First Amendment. Holmes had drawn a line around 
speech-acts and asked us to accept that there may be acts of 
speech which are not protected by the First Amendment, acts 
which can be abridged by virtue of the threat of harm which 
they represent. But the primary purpose of the First 
Amendment was to guarantee that voters must vote freely, and 
judges and Congress as well. In none of these instances
^Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self 
Government. (New York:Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948) P.34
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could freedom of speech be abridged. Holmes's use of the 
fire-shouting illustration spoke to a criminal action which 
was not protected by our conception of free speech. But what 
Holmes succeeded in doing was to make questionable that 
specific area of speech which might be covered by the rubric 
"clear and present danger." In Meiklejohn's view, so long as 
a man's "active" words are those he speaks as a participant 
in public discussion and the decision of public policy, his 
words must be free from abridgment. What the "clear and 
present danger" doctrine accomplished was to present a 
threat which in its potentiality was far greater than the 
alleged harm of the behavior it prohibited. The very act of 
opening up the question of whether freedom of speech could 
be subject to the judgment of a specific group is what in 
actuality represented the potential danger. He points to the 
change in Holmes's thought in the latter days of the year 
1919, and of his eventual recognition that the doctrine of 
"clear and present danger" was unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, 
the test remains on the books. It is, "a working device."^ 
Holmes's ambivalent phrase which, although rejected by its 
initiator, continues to constitute an exception to the 
freedom of speech. It stands on the record of the Court as a
100 Id at P. 53.
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peculiarly inept and unsuccessful attempt to formulate an 
exception to the principle of freedom of speech.^
With reference to the change in perspective to which 
Meiklejohn alludes, David S. Bogen has made some interesting 
comments concerning the question of whether there was in 
fact any evidence of a real metamorphosis in Holmes's view 
of free speech. He argues that the seeds of what was to 
become the "clear and present danger" test had been 
developed early in Holmes's life, and adds that the 
justice's skepticism and his unwillingness to depart from 
prevailing legal doctrine had joined in preventing these 
seeds from coming to fruition until he was in his seventies. 
Abrams provides the example of such a "metamorphosis." The 
sacredness of any existing ideas had never appealed to the 
skeptical Holmes. He goes on to cite a letter from Holmes to 
Pollack written in April of 1910, in which Holmes indicated 
his skepticism as to our knowledge about the goodness or 
badness of laws. Holmes had said that there was no way to 
make such a definitive judgment outside of doing "what the 
crowd wants.
Looking at these points of view, one cannot help but 
recognize that an attempt to understand Holmes must be more 
than an examination of his isolated decisions. Are we being
10lId. at P. 50.
102"2j,e Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes", David S. 
Bogen, Hofstra Law Review. Volume II, No.l, Fall 1982.
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entirely fair in judging an individual's choices in 
microcosm? We may be wrong in condemning Holmes for what at 
the time seemed the appropriate choice.
I doubt that Meiklejohn's criticism was meant ad 
hominem. His is rather another perspective on the 
contradictory nature of the opinions which color the 
variegated fabric of Holmes's career in the law, and the 
effect that they had on American jurisprudence. Holmes's 
heritage must necessarily include the fallout from his 
"clear and present danger" test, but it is recognizable from 
reading the story of his life that he had always been an 
ardent patriot. A philosophy such as his does not seem 
inappropriate in light of his past.
Justice Holmes had fought in the Civil War, almost 
giving his life on several occasions. He had seen the result 
of the undecided issue of state's rights, and his response 
was unquestionably reflected in many of the decisions he 
rendered. He recognized that freedom of speech might be 
potentially threatening in certain circumstances. It could 
also offer the possibility for positive change. This 
dichotomy apparently vied for Holmes's support. He 
undoubtedly accepted the concept of free speech in the 
abstract, but there was also that component of his 
philosophy which maintained that government must take those 
steps necessary to protect its ultimate survival, even as it 
related to this freedom. The Civil War had been a period in 
which men needed to confront such questions.
74
If Lincoln had sensed the necessity for doing away with 
habeas corpus when the future of the nation was at stake, 
perhaps Holmes saw a comparable rationale on the issue of 
freedom of speech in yet another highly volatile time. One 
must wonder whether Holmes had chosen to balance these 
contending free speech perspectives, selecting what in the 
circumstances seemed a more "pragmatic" solution to a 
comparable dilemma.
In the view of many, Holmes's point of view concerning 
freedom of speech softened prior to his opinion in Abrams.
He moved away from the "clear and present danger" doctrine 
and examined each case on its own merit. It has been 
suggested that such change may have been the result of 
pressures exerted by individuals he greatly respected, as 
well as, and perhaps more importantly, in light of that 
characteristic quality which pervaded the judicial life of 
Holmes. The skeptic, the eternal scholar, the justice so 
often accused of contradictory position taking was not a man 
who shrank from the possibility for change--not in his own 
point of view or in the law. He had said, "We too need 
education in the obvious--to learn, to transcend our own 
convictions and to leave room for much that we hold dear to 
be done away with short of revolution by the orderly change 
of law."^ Was it in fact such "orderly change" which is 
reflected in his decent in Abrams?
^  Supra Note 9
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Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down the 
decision in Debs. Judge Learned Hand wrote to Holmes that,
"Opinions are at best provincial hypotheses, incompletely 
tested...they are never absolutes. So we must be tolerant of 
opposite opinions or varying opinions by the very fact of 
the incredulity of our own." Hand had proposed a standard of 
"direct incitement" which was unusually protective of free 
speech, and had argued that only "direct advocacy" of 
unlawful acts could be punished; all other speech, no matter 
how critical of governmental policies, would be protected.^
Further correspondence between Holmes and Hand late in 
March of 1919 carried with it Hand's argument that speech 
only violated the Espionage Act, "when the words were 
directly an incitement." It was clear that in his view,
Debs' intent was not at issue here. He believed that Debs 
would have been guilty only if he had actually incited his 
listeners to violate the law. Holmes's response on April 3 
indicated that he saw no basic difference in their 
thinking. ̂  And, in a letter written by Holmes to Herbert 
Croly on May 12 of the same year, a letter which he never in 
actuality sent to Croly, but rather to Harold Laski, Holmes 
commented on an article by Ernest Freund in The New 
Republic. The .article was titled "The Debs Case and Freedom
noted in Gerald Gunther, "Learned Hand and the Origins of 
Modem First Amendment Doctrine: Seme Fragments of History. " Stanford 
Law Review. XXVII (1975) P. 720.
105 Id.
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of Speech," and in it, Freund had criticized Holmes's
decision in Debs, citing the arbitrariness of the whole idea
of implied provocation. The copy of this letter appears in
the highly telling correspondence Holmes shared with Laski,
and based on Holmes's comment that this was "poor stuff,"
one may recognize the effect such criticism was having on 
107his psyche.
The months that followed his decision in Schenck served
to elicit what for some was a changed viewpoint from the
judge. It is conceivable that an article that appeared in
the Harvard Law Review of June, 1919, and written by
Zechariah Chafee, had given Holmes pause. In the article,
Chafee had argued that, "unless it is clearly liable to
cause direct and dangerous interference with the conduct of
the war...the line should be drawn, close to the point where
words will give rise to unlawful acts." Chafee had also
provided additional questions concerning the rationale
100Holmes had used in Schenck. Frohwerk and Debs.
Further, in a letter written in October of 1919,
interestingly at the time in which the Court would hear
argument in the case of Abrams, one may find that, although
'^Ernest Freund, "The Debs Case and Freedcm of Speech," The New 
Republic, XIX, May 3, 1919, P. 13.
^  Holmes-Laski Letters (cited earlier) Supra Note 14, P. 203.
Zechariah Chafee, "Freedcm Of Speech In Wartime, " Harvard Law 
Review. XXXII (June 1919) P. 932-73.
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Holmes had chosen not to acknowledge the aforementioned
criticism, it is arguable that it had affected him.
Regarding his readings, so well documented in the
correspondence with Laski and Sir Frederick Pollack, Holmes
had apparently spent considerable time during this period
studying political philosophy, biography and history. There
can also be little doubt that the opinions of others were in
fact on his mind.
In the words of a letter Holmes sent to Laski on
October 26, 1919, one must conclude that, although he has
been credited with a real metamorphosis in philosophy,
Holmes continued to show allegiance to that Common Law
philosophy upon which he had earlier relied. He wrote:
I fear we have less freedom of speech here than 
they have in England. Little as I  believe in it as 
a theory I hope I  would die for it and I go as far 
as anyone whom I regard as competent to form an 
opinion, in favor of it. Of course when I say I 
don't believe in it as a theory I don't mean that 
I do believe in the opposite as a theory. But on 
their premises it seems to me logical in the 
Catholic Church to kill heretics and the Puritans 
to whip Quakers--and I  see nothing more wrong in 
it from our ultimate standards than I  do in 
killing Germans when we are at war. When you are 
thoroughly convinced that you are right-- 
wholeheartedly desire an end--and have no doubt of 
your power to accomplish it--I see nothing but 
municipal regulations to interfere with your using 
your power to accomplish it.
The sacredness of human life is a formula that is 
good only inside a system of 1aw--and so of the 
rest--all of which apart from its banality I fear 
seems cold talk if you have been made to feel 
popular displeasure. I  should not be cold about 
that--nor do I  in any way shrink from saying what
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I think--but I can't spare the energy necessary to
deal with extra legal themes... * (*my italics)
The correspondence Holmes shared with Sir Frederick 
Pollack also overflowed with comment on the reading Holmes 
found time to do in this very volatile period in his 
judicial life. In April of 1919 he had written to Pollack 
that he planned first to read Harold Laski's new book, 
Authority in the Modern State, a book dedicated by the 
author to both Holmes and Felix Frankfurter. He also 
mentioned that he was getting "stupid letters of protest 
against a decision that Debs, a noted agitator, was rightly 
convicted of obstructing the recruiting service so far as 
the law was concerned... There was a lot of jaw about free 
speech, which I dealt with somewhat summarily in an earlier 
case-Schenck v U.S.--also Frohwerk v. U.S....As it happens I 
should go further probably than the majority in favor of 
it... " ^  These are certainly contradictory words from a man 
who has been alleged to have taken a real turn in his 
philosophy on the issue of free speech, a change of mind 
that would in fact determine his dissent in Abrams.
For some, the change had been from a more conservative 
philosophy of the law based in Blackstonian Common Law 
jurisprudence, to the more open minded stance. But for
^  Holmes-Laski Letters, P. 217-218.
^ Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice 
Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932.. Ed. Mark Deffolfe Howe, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1941, 1961) Addenda, P.7.
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others, this is only further corroboration of the philosophy 
he had followed to date. Here again one is confronted with
an enigma. What in fact had been Holmes's rationale for the
dissent in the Abrams case?
In Felix Frankfurter's estimate of Justice Holmes, we
find another contribution to the debate as to whether Holmes
had actually changed his point of view on free speech:
Just as he would allow experiments in economics 
which he himself viewed with doubt and distrust, 
so he would protect speech that offended his taste 
and wisdom. At bottom both attitudes came from a 
central faith and a governing skepticism. Since 
the whole of the truth had not yet been, and is 
not likely to be...The first duty of an educated
man was to doubt his major premise even while he
continued to act on it. This was the skeptical 
conviction with which he distrusted dogma, whether 
economic or intellectual. He had a positive faith- 
-faith in the gradual power to pierce nature's 
mysteries through man's indomitable endeavors.
This was the road by which he reached an attitude 
of widest tolerance towards views which were 
strange and uncongenial to him, lest by a 
premature stifling even of crude or groping ideas 
society might be deprived of eventual wisdom for 
attaining a gracious civilization.
In his dissent in Abrams. had Holmes in fact, "doubted 
that major premise" which he had followed prior to it? If 
the premise had centered around his views concerning the 
ultimate primacy of government and its objectified law, can 
we look at Abrams as anything more than a reinforcement of 
that position?
Fran Mr. Justice Holmes And The Supreme Court, (previously 
cited at Note 59), P. 85.
On November 19, 1919, Holmes and Brandeis would cast
the two dissenting votes in the case of Abrams v United 
I I PStates. In August of 1918, Jacob Abrams, a Russian 
immigrant and an anarchist had been arrested in New York, 
along with several of his associates. The charges had been 
that they conspired to publish and distribute (1) language 
about the form of government of the United States that was 
"disloyal, scurrilous and abusive." (2) "language intended 
to bring the form of government of the United States into 
contempt" (3)language "intended to incite, provoke, and 
encourage resistance to the United States in its war with 
Germany, and...(4)language that advocated "curtailment of 
production of things and products, to wit, ordinance and 
ammunition necessary and essential to the prosecution of the 
war."113
The government's evidence included two circulars, one 
written in English and the other in Yiddish, and the 
printing and distribution of these circulars in circles 
where there was some chance of causing opposition to the 
American government's policy of intervention in Russia and 
harm to the war effort in Germany. The issue underlined by 
the prosecution had been that of "intent," and the 
defendants had argued that their criticism had.only been of 
policies that President Wilson's administration had pursued
lU250 U.S. 616 (1919)
113 Id at 617.
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regarding Russia. They maintained that they had not 
encouraged resistance to the United States or to the war 
effort against Germany.
Judge Clayton, in his directions to the jury, had 
indicated a clear dichotomy between motive and intention, "A 
motive is that which leads a person to do a certain act. The 
intention is a design, or a plan, or purpose to use a 
particular means to effect a certain result. According to 
Clayton, the jury could convict the accused even if the 
purpose of his acts had not been to hinder the war effort or 
to provoke resistance. The appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court was predicated upon this very issue. The 
defense argued that there had been no evidence presented 
that the defendants had violated the Espionage Act. If the 
evidence was enough for a conviction, then the Espionage Act 
was unconstitutional.
All that the defendants had done, according to the 
defense, was to engage in a public discussion of a public 
policy that dealt with a nation with which our country was 
not at war. They maintained that the Constitution gave 
absolute protection to those whose intent was only to 
criticize existing policy of government officials. Holmes's 
dissent, if it was based upon his theory of legal liability, 
appears to have offered him little choice. It was
Recorded at P. 237-238 of Abrams.
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unconstitutional to punish a person for conspiracy without
evidence of unlawful purposes. He argued that no one could
believe that "the surreptitious publishing of a silly
leaflet by an unknown man; without more, would present any
immediate danger."^s (*my italics) And added that publishing
"these opinions for the very purpose of obstruction...might
indicate greater danger, and at any rate would have the
quality of an attempt."^ Such an intent could not be found,
and was therefore not a basis for imposing liability on the
defendants. These defendants had not, as was the case in
Debs. attempted to obstruct the draft. They had not tried to
obtain an unlawful result, nor had they represented a threat
of harm to the status quo. The following words from Holmes's
opinion in Abrams, serve well to explicate both the
philosophy he held concerning the case in question, and more
importantly, may lead us to a better understanding of that
philosophy of law and the Constitution which defined his
jurisprudence:
That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is 
an experiment. Every year if not every day we have 
to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based 
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is 
part of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe 
to be fraught with death, unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that 
an immediate check is required to save the
115 Id. at 616, 629.
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country... Only the emergency that makes it 
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of 
evil counsels to time warrants making any 
exception to the sweeping command, Congress shall 
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.
It is clear that, although Holmes has been considered a
liberal by many, the 1950s and 60s saw a growth of
commentary which was highly critical of the argument that
Abrams represented a distinct change in Holmes's free speech
position. Samuel Konefsky has argued that Holmes had no real
ideas of his own, only unreflective prejudices--"clear and
present danger" accordingly was just a casual remark, a
rationalization to uphold criminal convictions, that did not
become one for protecting freedom of speech until Justice
I JffBrandeis lent his "powerful support."
Sheldon Novick has also pointed to Yosal Rogat's 
criticism of Holmes, in which, according to Novick, Rogat 
has traced the doctrine of Schenck to the external standard 
of The Common Law. 119 Novick goes on to take the position 
that anyone who suggests that Holmes's point of view 
concerning freedom of speech did in fact change is clearly
117 Id at 630-631.
1 1 flSamuel Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis. (Macmillan: 
1956), as cited in Sheldon Novick, "The Unrevised Holmes and Freedom of 
Expression," First Amendment Law Handbook 1993-94 Edition, (Deerfield, 
111.'.Clark Boardman Callaghan:1993) Page 201.
Sheldon Novick, "The Unrevised Holmes and Freedcm of 
Expression", in First Amendment Handbook 1993-1994 Edition, (Deerfield, 
111.: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993) P. 206, 207.
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incorrect. Rogat's essay, "Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting 
Opinion," written for the Stanford Law Review in 1984, is, 
for the most part, a very strong and well documented 
argument. In the preface to the article, there is a 
reference back to a prior statement made by the author:
Holmes's opinions are among the tersest and most 
elliptical n the history of the Supreme Court.
This contributes to their rhetorical power, but it 
also makes them particularly difficult to 
construe, and open to diverse interpretation.
This article, published by James M. O ’Fallon, with the
permission of Rogat's children, had been the second half of
the work Rogat began in 1962. Rogat once again attacked
Holmes's account of legal phenomena. According to Rogat's
critique, it was "basically impoverished." In his view,
Holmes suffered from a failure to distinguish a crude system
of social control which rested upon naked force from a
distinctively legal method of control. For Holmes, "a legal
system was simply a mechanism to enforce the desires of the
M ldominant group." Justice Holmes's objective approach to 
the law saw it as simply an attempt to reduce law to an 
external standard. What follows in Rogat's work is a telling 
citation from one of Holmes's earliest opinions:
Yosal Rogat, "Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion," 15 
Stanford Law Review 3, (1962-63) P. 254
1 l
Yosal Rogat and James O ’Fallan, "Mr. Justice: A Dissenting 
Opinion—  The Speech Cases," Stanford Law Review. Vol. 36, July 1984. P. 
1361,62
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As the aim of law is not to punish sins, but is to 
prevent certain external results, the act done 
must come pretty near accomplishing the result 
before the law will notice it.
In conclusion, Rogat argues that for Holmes, judges 
should be "neutral, friction free transmission belts, making 
political rights exactly equivalent to societal power.
Novick's essay also speaks to Holmes's views relating 
to the question of social policy. Holmes had argued that the 
privilege accorded to free speech was a justification for 
self restraint on that privilege. Self restraint could from 
Holmes's perspective, only be based on the self interest of 
the individual citizen. As far as government was concerned, 
by virtue of its own self interest, it ought not allow 
experiments with ideas and laws designed and intended to 
destroy it. "Clear and present danger" for Holmes, as 
Sheldon Novick reads it, is just "one of many shorthand 
expressions for this central idea, the point at which 
individual liberty was set aside by the importance of
174governmental interest. In essence, for Holmes, law was 
what judges decided, and the rule of law meant a system of 
peaceful debate to which all individuals were admitted so
322 Commonweal th v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18,20,48 N.E. 770 (1897), as 
cited in Rogat P. 1365.
123Id. P. 1368
124 Id. at 417-419.
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long as they followed the rules, no matter how dangerous
U cwere the ideas.
What this examination has produced thus far appears to 
coincide with many of the views expressed by both White and 
Novick. There is, however, a point made by White that may be 
open to discussion. White has suggested that there is no 
question but that Holmes's later free speech decisions 
reflect his expanded consciousness of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and that he diverged from his earlier 
position, recognizing these amendments as significant in and 
of themselves and not as simply codification or analogies of 
the Common Law. He has also commented that toward the 
conclusion of Holmes's legal career, the Justice seemed more 
concerned with making clear his increased awareness of the 
implications of free speech than with maintaining doctrinal
iirconsistency.
If one examines the litany of his free speech opinions, 
Holmes's first priority appeared to remain consistent with 
the words he had written in his examination of The Common 
Law. Public policy must sacrifice the rights of the
127individual to the general good. Recognizably, he had been 
willing to see Abrams on its own merits, but one might
^  Supra Note 84., P. 437.
1 As found in The Caiman Law, Op cit 95.
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comfortably argue that this case was not evidence that 
Holmes had changed at all. His dissent in Abrams. can only 
be understood as centered upon the "attempts" rationale he 
had used earlier. There had been no "attempt" to subvert the 
ends of government in Holmes's view. That would seem to have 
been enough to satisfy his standards.
Holmes was undoubtedly the skeptic that Felix 
Frankfurter had described. It was surely the ability of 
Oliver Wendell Holmes to recognize the implicit differences 
in the cases he was to decide--to view them, in his own 
words, "in the light of different circumstances," that 
clearly marks his decisions. This does not, however, make a 
convincing argument that his basic belief in the character 
of the law had seen a metamorphosis, or that he had come to 
see the position of a judge as more than the restatement in 
a particular generation of the "present" point of view.^
The first free speech dissent following Abrams was in 
United States ex rel, Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing 
Co. v Burl sen. . The issues in this case dealt with whether
the Postmaster General of Milwaukee had discretionary 
authority to exclude publications from the mails based on a 
guess as to their future content. The Postmaster General had
128 path of The Law," Oliver Wendell Holmes. Harvard Law 
Review. Vol X, No. 8, March, 1897. P. 458.
129 2 55 U.S. 407, 436 (1920)
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in fact denied second-class mailing privileges to the 
newspaper, the Milwaukee Leader, on the grounds that it had 
printed articles critical of the war effort, and thus under 
the rules of the Espionage Act of 1917, such newspapers had 
been "non-mailable." Although the Act had not indicated that 
future issues of a "non-mailable" publication could be 
barred, the Postmaster General had taken the position that 
in the light of past violations the newspaper had forfeited 
its second class mailing privileges, and therefore the 
government could refuse to renew them. ^  The majority of the 
Court held that the articles had clearly violated the 
Espionage Act and that in the light of this, the Postmaster 
could presume from this that future publications would do so 
as well. Holmes, confessing that until he had read 
Brandeis's dissent he had been inclined to adopt the 
majority position, indicated that he was now convinced that, 
"the Postmaster General could not determine non-mai1abi1ity 
in advance." The only thing he could do under the statute 
was to deny second-class mail privileges and after the 
publications were mailed, refrain from forwarding the 
papers... and return them to the senders." He was not in 
Holmes's view empowered to decide on the basis of a 
publication's content, whether it could not be carried in
130 Id. at 412.
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the mails.^ Holmes argued that the Postmaster General had 
lacked authority to deny access to the mails in future.
There had been no explicit statutory language which conveyed 
him such power. In his opinion, "the use of the mails is 
almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our 
tongues, and it would take very strong language to convince 
me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically
I 9*despotic power to any man." Denial of second-class mailing
privileges for the future, in the Justice's view was a
serious attack on our liberties.
In a similar case the next year, Leach v Carli1e
Postmaster (1921), the Post Office refused to transmit
advertising literature for "Organo Tablets" on the grounds
of fraudulent representation of medicine, Holmes and
Brandeis again refused to join in the majority opinion.
Holmes's opinion stated that:
I do not suppose that any one would say that the 
freedom of written speech is less protected by the 
First Amendment than the freedom of the spoken 
word. Therefore I can not understand by what 
authority Congress undertakes to authorize anyone 
to determine in advance, on the grounds before us,
that certain words shall not be uttered. Even
those who interpret the Amendment must strictly 




Ul258 U.S. 138, 140 (1921)
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If one attempts to appropriately understand the 
significance of Holmes’s words here, it seems clear that 
there was a distinct and necessary separation between what 
the law would allow and the abstract rights of individual 
ci ti zens.
It was in Git low v. New York and United States v. 
Schwimmer where some argue that Holmes's reputation as a 
civil libertarian was greatly advanced. An examination of 
each of these cases will nevertheless show that his 
decisions were based on an underlying philosophy of law that 
in fact permeated his free speech opinions.
Under New York law, Gitlow had been found guilty of 
advocating criminal anarchy. Six years had passed since the 
Abrams decision. It was 1925, and the First World War was no 
longer a central issue. The conviction of Gitlow had been 
based upon the publication of a pamphlet called "The Left 
Wing Manifesto," in which he had written of proletarian 
dictatorship, political strikes and similar issues. He had 
concluded his pamphlet with the words, "The Communist 
International calls the proletariat of the world to a final 
struggle." He had been charged with only the circulation of 
this pamphlet. No questions had been raised as to overt acts 
directed toward the overthrow of the government. The issues 
in the case involved nothing more than whether political 
agitation by words was constitutionally protected. The
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Court's decision was that they were not. Holmes's dissent in
this case initially argued that since this was an alleged
infringement of free speech by a state rather than by the
federal government, free speech was not specifically
protected from state encroachment in the Constitution.
The First Amendment related only to actions of the
federal government, and thus, the "due process" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable here. He then
went on to define what in his judgment were the allowable
areas of free speech:
If what I think the correct test is applied, it is 
manifest that there as no present danger of an 
attempt to overthrow the government by force on 
the part of the admittedly small minority who 
shared the defendant's views. It is said that this 
manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an 
incitement. Every idea is an incitement... The only 
difference between the expression of an opinion 
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the 
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may 
set fire to reason...
If the publication of this document had been laid 
as an attempt to induce an uprising against 
government at once and not at some indefinite time 
in the future it would have presented a different 
question. The object would have been one with 
which the law might deal, subject to the doubt 
whether there was any danger that the publication 
could produce any result...But the indictment 
alleges the publication and nothing more. * (*my 
italics)
Justice Sanford, speaking for the Court indicated that 
the reasonable exercise of the state's police power was 
constitutional. Harmful speech acts were within the power of
134Id.
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the state, and the advocacy of anarchy was sufficiently 
dangerous to be considered a harmful speech a c t.^ It is 
interesting that the Court, without Holmes's support, had 
used a somewhat changed version of his "clear and present 
danger" test, and that Holmes had cited his own version of 
"clear and present danger" but with an important disclaimer.
The Justice's choice not to defer to a legislative 
finding that advocating criminal anarchy was harmful to the 
state appears some how contradictory. However, he himself as 
early as 1897, had said that the law's purpose was to punish 
harmful acts, not sinners. Perhaps a person who advocated 
criminal anarchy in a situation where no harm could occur 
might be an evil person, but he had done nothing harmful. 
Nonetheless, one must wonder whether Holmes's decision might 
have been a different one if the charge had been conspiracy.
H.L. Pohlman argues that Holmes had indicated by his 
position in Gitlow the necessary balance that had to be 
maintained between individual rights and legislative 
authority. He has attempted to tie together the motivating 
factors recognizable in Holmes's decision. He understood 
speech activity according to three categories of his theory 
of legal liability: harmful acts, attempts, and abuses of 
privileges. Harmful acts were treated especially harshly.
135 Id. at 671.
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If a rational and prudent person, knowing what the agent 
knew in the circumstances of an act, would judge the 
speaker's act to be harmful in itself, the speaker was 
liable no matter the intent or foresight. Libel and contempt 
of court were examples of such harmful acts, while Gitlow's 
advocacy of anarchy was not.
It is remarkable, though, that at eighty four, in 
December of 1925, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to his friend 
Laski, "The Chief called me up by telephone to know if a 
case that he proposed to assign to me would be too 
troublesome...I told him that if he spared me in that way I 
ought to leave. He gave me the case and I polished it off in 
short metre. . . This letter to Laski is full of talk of 
the intellectual pleasure his cases for the year had 
supplied. He had even added a word about his efforts at 
writing them shortly and compactly with a hint at general 
theory when it was possible. This had provided "good sport" 
for a rather remarkable man who by most standards should 
have been ready to retire.
Although for many, Holmes's opinion in Gitlow marked a 
turning point in the adjudicative processes of our nation, 
White has underlined the ambiguities in Holmes's approach in
'^H.L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. (New York: New 
York University Press, 1991) P. 87
':l Hemes-Laski Letters. P. 806.
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the case. He goes so far as to say that even if Gitlow did
not present a libertarian trend in Holmes's view of speech,
there is evidence that he did feel a sense of commitment in
this area, and he argues that in the last years of the
Justice's career, his positions on the issue would be
irreconcilable with his Espionage Act opinions. In addition,
White believes:
The dizzying contradictory implications of these 
several sentences suggest the risk inherent in 
assuming that Holmes' striking phrases express a 
developed ideology. Holmes the judge was often 
consumed by the sheer attraction of language 
itself. Phrases like "every idea is an excitement" 
and "the only meaning of free speech" exemplified 
his style. Although arresting and memorable, they 
often collapse as analytical guidelines.
In the final analysis, Holmes's Gitlow dissent was more
an example of his distinctive literary style than an attempt
to develop a new First Amendment jurisprudence. Holmes could
not have been expected to be governed by the unqualified
language he used, because he himself believed that all legal
questions were questions of degree. In the free speech cases
that followed Git low, cases in which Holmes joined with
Brandeis in the years between 1925 and the end of his tenure
on the Court, he showed what was in White's view, a clear
j i gcommitment to free speech.
^  White, Supra Note 84, P. 444
*̂ <7. Edward White, "Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free 
Speech Jurisprudence:The Human Dimension." In First amendment Law 
Handbook. (Deerfield, 111.:Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1993) P. 487
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As understood by both White and Novick, the opinion 
which best exemplifies Holmes's consciousness toward free 
speech is that which he rendered in United States v 
Schwimmer The case dealt with a forty-nine year old woman 
of Hungarian citizenship who had applied for American 
citizenship. The woman, Rosika Schwimmer, was a prominent 
pacifist, who in 1915, while she was still living in 
Hungary, had persuaded Henry Ford to send a peace ship to 
Europe to, in her words, "bring the boys out of the trenches 
by Christmas."^
After coming to the United States in 1921 for a visit 
and lecture tour, she had settled in Illinois. In November 
of 1921 Schwimmer had declared her intention to become an 
American citizen, and in 1926 had filed a petition for 
naturalization. When asked, as part of the naturalization 
process, whether she was "willing to take up arms in defense 
of her country," her answer had been in the negative. Upon 
filing a petition for citizenship, her request was denied on 
the grounds that she was "unable...to take the prescribed 
oath of allegiance," and was therefore, "not attached to the 
principles of the Constitution of the United States" nor 
"well disposed to the good order and happiness of the
140279 U.S. 644 (1929)
141 Id.
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same."^ She was, however, granted a hearing by the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which reversed the original 
finding, and the case was heard by the Supreme Court in 
April of 1929.
Holmes's dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by
Brandeis, is unquestionably one of his most respected. His 
reference back to Schenck makes a rather large portion of 
the decision worthy of examination here:
Of course the fear is that if war came the 
applicant would exert activities such as were 
dealt with in Schenck v United States. But that 
seems to me unfounded. Her position and motives 
are wholly different from those of Schenck. She is 
an optimist and states in strong and, I do not 
doubt, sincere words her belief that war will 
disappear and that the impending destiny of 
mankind is to unite in peaceful leagues. I do not 
share that optimism nor do I think that a 
philosophic view of the world would regard war as 
absurd.
But most people who have know it regard it with 
horror, as a last resort, and ...would welcome any 
practicable combination that would increase the 
power on the side of peace...Some of her answers 
might excite popular prejudice, but if there is 
any principle of the Constitution that more 
imperatively calls for attachment than any other 
it is the principle of free thought-- not free 
thought for those who agree with us but freedom 
for the thought that we hate. I think that we 
should adhere to that principle with regard to 
admission into, as well as to life within this 
country.
142 Id. at 646
143 Id.
144 Id. at 653-54
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Both Novick and White argue that this case represented 
a total abandonment of the "clear and present danger" test. 
However, although Meiklejohn would undoubtedly disagree, it 
has for many become a viable means for protecting those with 
divergent points of view. If the only limit put on freedom 
of speech is the question of whether certain statements 
represent the imminent danger of harm to the nation, then 
any speech that stands outside of this requisite addendum is 
in fact not subject to prohibition. Although I would 
maintain that the impetus for Holmes's original choice of 
these words was his desire to conserve the power of the 
state, they are for many an indication of a strongly 
libertarian point of view. It may also explain why so much 
confusion exists concerning Holmes's liberal/conservative 
status.
In White's view, at the time when Holmes was to emerge 
as one of the founders of modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the locus of philosophical energy animating 
solicitude for free speech had shifted from the individual 
as an autonomous being to the individual as participant in a 
democratic society. According to this new school of thought, 
the sources of protection for speech were not identified 
with the interest of the individual whose liberty government 
existed to further, but rather with the social interest in
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furthering democratic principles by encouraging independent
public discussion and debate.^ He goes on to say that:
The process by which Holmes participated in the 
transformation of free speech jurisprudence was in 
the end an idiosyncratic process, despite its 
larger doctrinal implications. By treating Holmes' 
free speech cases as if they were the formulations 
of an orthodox judicial-opinion writer, some 
scholars have been misled into emphasizing 
doctrinal continuity or contradiction, when Holmes 
was not particularly interested, except on a 
surface level, in those dimensions of his 
opinions. Others have been overly anxious to 
identify Holmes as the founder of a modern 
libertarian tradition of First Amendment 
analysis ...
But, White argues, early twentieth century First
Amendment jurisprudence did not mirror the evolution in
Holmes's thought. Holmes was logically inconsistent in his
free speech decisions. Looking for some logical progression
in Holmes's free speech jurisprudence can only lead to
frustration. There is no rational way to square his views
with either a positivist view or with conventional theories
147of judicial deference to the will of the majority.
Turning back to "The Path of the Law," one finds some 
clear indicators of the legal philosophy that in actuality 
colored Holmes's free speech decisions. This essay, seen as 





Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, presents 
the clearest picture of where he stood at the time he wrote 
it, and where he would continue to stand as an adjudicator. 
In light of what Holmes had said in 1897, to argue that 
there was no logical progression in his decision making does 
not necessarily have to serve aa a condemnation. When Holmes 
argued that, "The reports of a given jurisdiction in the 
course of a generation take up pretty much the whole body of 
the law, and restates it from the present point of view,"^ 
there can be no doubt that for him, law was an ever-changing 
phenomenon. The law was,"the prophecies of what the courts 
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious."^
Holmes was the skeptic here, the realist who understood 
that in each given instance where a judge was asked to make 
a decision, the possibility existed that he might choose a 
different course, see in a different set of circumstances a 
reason to change his mind. This was perhaps the judge we 
find in Gitlow. Nonetheless, he was also the ardent advocate 
of principles established in the Common Law. Recounting the 
issues in a case heard some three hundred years earlier, he 
talked of the "now" in which he found himself, a now where 
malevolent motives could not be seen in a moral sense, 
morals were irrelevant. The issue for him was undoubtedly
148St«>ra Note 128, P. 458.
at 461
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the motivation for his decisions in Abrams, Debs and
Schenck. These were cases in which the question of liability
prevailed for Holmes:
But nowadays no one doubts that a man may be 
liable, without any malevolent motive at all, for 
false statements manifestly calculated to inflict 
temporal damage. In stating the case in pleading, 
we still could call the defendant's conduct 
malicious; but, in my opinion, at least, the word 
means nothing about motives, or even about the 
defendant's attitude toward the future, but only 
signifies that the tendency of his conduct under 
the known circumstances was very plainly to cause 
the plaintiff temporary harm.
There is no definitive rightness or wrongness that the 
judge may turn to. For Holmes, certainty was generally only 
an illusion. It was that judgment as to the relative worth 
and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an 
inarticulate and unconscious judgment that was at the heart 
of every legal proceeding. The law was the preference of a 
given body at a given time and place. We didn't adequately 
realize that a large part of the law was open to 
reconsideration predicated upon only a small change in the 
public mind.^ Here was Holmes the relativist, and probably 
the judge we see in Git1o w . But his were also the words of 
the Legal Realist we find in Schwimmer:
150 Id. at 463.
151 Id. at 466
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I think that they themselves have failed 
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing 
considerations of social advantage. The duty is 
inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed 
judicial aversion to deal with such considerations 
is simply to leave the very ground and foundation 
of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious 
judges 152
Yes, we have found many aspects of Holmes in his free 
speech decisions, but we are being unfair if we are too fast 
in condemning him for his contradictory stances. He said in 
1897, and his actions in the years to come would vindicate 
his belief that, "We are only at the beginning of a 
philosophical reaction, and of a reconsideration of the 
worth of doctrines which, for the most part still are taken 
for granted without any deliberate, conscious and systematic 
questioning of their grounds."^
How prescient was this statement. One must wonder what 
he would have said had he known the full impact of his 
"clear and present danger" test. He might well have 
attributed its ramifications to anything but the original 
significance of the words. It is interesting to consider the 
possibility that had he lived, Holmes would have understood, 
as he did in 1897, that the law continued to be what judges 
decided.
152 Id. at 467
153 Id. at 468.
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Although many would quote his words with reverence, and 
others criticize him for a lack in continuity, Holmes might 
have undoubtedly chuckled at the significance that had been 
made of his contribution. He was never an ideologue, and 
surely not a predictable entity. His belief in this system 
of government is undeniable, as was his confidence that 
humanity's search for answers would continue long after he 
was gone. Perhaps Oliver Wendell Holmes cannot entirely 
satisfy the demands of the libertarians, but neither can he 
speak for the advocates of totalitarianism.
This judge of the Progressive era didn't always satisfy 
the progressives. He was also not always the voice of 
conservatism. Holmes was the product of a generation which 
had begun to question itself, a generation still influenced 
by its past, but also recognizing on many levels that it 
couldn't march securely forward without recognizing that 
change was endemic to the human condition. His influence was 
profound, and his acolytes profuse. Felix Frankfurter, one 
of many who followed, would often attempt to walk in his 
mentor's footsteps. The question remains as to how Holmes's 
philosophy effected this younger man, a man who would also 
make his mark on American jurisprudence.
CHAPTER 7 
FELIX FRANKFURTER: FREE SPEECH,
FOLLOWER OR INNOVATOR--A QUESTION OF DEGREE
The literature is replete with commentary on the 
judicial career of Felix Frankfurter, and as one examines 
the positions he took in the area of civil liberties, there 
emerges a picture that is often contradictory. Such 
seemingly inconsistent behavior it might well be argued, 
does not relate entirely to some philosophical change of 
heart, because his insistence upon judicial restraint 
remained consistent.
Undoubtedly, Frankfurter appeared to have come a 
distance from Gobitis to Sweezy, but one must question 
whether what seemed an apparent metamorphosis did not in 
fact serve to reify his basic jurisprudence. What we do find 
in the litany of Frankfurter's opinions is a clear 
contradiction of his pre-court, more liberal political 
stance.
In reviewing his opinions as a member of the Supreme 
Court, what may be discoverable is the explication of what 
Felix Frankfurter considered the appropriate position the 
judiciary must take in American government. This is a 
position which he appeard to have diligently attempted to 




Some would argue that Frankfurter’s tenure on the Court
lacked a commitment to civil liberties and civil rights, not
living up to the expectations engendered by his pre-Court
career.^  Others would defend him, arguing that his
reputation has suffered in this area not because he was
paralyzed, but because of the lesson of judicial humility he
had learned, and which constantly tempered his judgments.2̂
How like words we have heard said of Holmes are these:
Frankfurter brought a unique historical 
perspective to each problem, seeking always to 
ensure that the changing currents of contemporary 
judicial conviction did not overwhelm the steady 
trend toward responsible democracy ....
William T.Coleman, Jr. suggests that for Justice
Frankfurter, constitutional litigation was not the provence
of absolutes, but only of relative values which were to be
articulated, weighed and compared, and Arthur E. Sutherland
has chosen to include a quotation from Holmes in examining
the jurisprudence of Frankfurter:
...In substance the growth of the law is 
1 egislative. . .The very considerations which judges 
most rarely mention, and always with an apology,
334Leonard Boudin, Book Review, 89 Harvard Law Review 282 (1975) 
(reviewing J. Lash, Fran the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter (1975))
333 "Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter: Civil Libertarian As Lawyer And 
As Justice: Extent to which Judicial Responsibilities Affected His Pre- 
Court Convictions." William T. Coleman, Jr., in Six Justices an 




are the secret roots from which the law draws all 
the juices of life. I mean, of course, 
considerations of what is expedient for the 
community concerned.157
Sutherland argues that it is precisely Frankfurter's 
sensitivity to all sides of a question that have made 
certain of his critics judge him as an intellectual 
turncoat, and such criticism is certainly understandable. 
Frankfurter had come to the Supreme Court as what many 
considered a liberal firebrand, and those decisions he would 
render had undoubtedly been a disappointment in the view of 
certain of his detractors. It is interesting to note that 
Sutherland also comments that Frankfurter distrusted, much 
as did Holmes before him, any idea that a verbal formula 
could make decisions for him, and thus eliminate the 
necessity of hard judicial choices.^
Alexander Bickel provides some interesting insight as 
well. For him, Frankfurter had deferred in two senses as a 
judge. He had deferred judgment to the greater precedence of 
political institutions, and in some instances had simply 
deferred judgment. Certain issues were not the province of 
the judiciary. For Frankfurter, courts were not 
representative bodies. This was the essence of the words he
^  "All Sides of the Question", Arthur E. Sutherland, in Felix 
Frankfurter: The Judge, ed. Wallace Mendel son, (New York:Reynal 6 
Carpany, 1964) P. 110.
158 Id. P. 148
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had written in his concurrence in Dennis v United States. 
Here was an instance in which Frankfurter chose to defer to 
the legislature, thus concluding that the anti-Communist 
Smith Act did not violate the First Amendment.^
Frankfurter, although thoroughly progressive and 
democratic, was also appropriately skeptical. He had 
apparently listened to Holmes's advice before and after 
Holmes gave it to him. Justice Frankfurter had never fallen 
prey to the vulgar cynicism that affected his fellow 
realists. Constitutional law was to be applied politics and 
constitutional adjudication was the job of a statesman.^
Not long after he came to the Court in 1939, Felix 
Frankfurter would, by those positions he took, indicate that 
he had undoubtedly brought with him a sense of public 
responsibility tempered with a belief that the judiciary 
must remain as apolitical as possible. One might question 
whether his decision in the Gobitis case was anything but 
political, however it is reasonable to conclude that in this 
instance Frankfurter's position was predicated upon his 
strong sense of public responsibility. It was time and place 
that appear to have been his major considerations in this
^Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, 
(New York: Harper S Row, Publishers, 1970) P. 30
160 Id., P. 23
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decision, and in many ways this would parallel future 
choices he would make as a judge.
In the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis
(1940), Frankfurter, in his opinion for the Court, expressed 
what he considered his necessary deference to maintaining 
judicial restraint even in face of what for some represented 
an open restriction on civil liberties.^ In 1936, Lillian 
Gobitis, age twelve, and her brother William had come home 
to inform their parents that they could no longer attend 
school because they had refused to salute the national flag. 
The reason why the children had refused to salute the flag 
was that as Jehovah's Witnesses, to salute the flag was a 
violation of their religion. The children's father filed 
suit on their behalf and his own, asking to be relieved of 
the financial burden of educating them elsewhere. He also 
sued to prevent the Board of Education from continuing to 
require the flag salute as a condition for the children's 
attendance at the Minersville school.
The case was heard in federal district court in
Philadelphia and the family was granted "relief" by the 
judge. The Minersville Board of Education appealed to the 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and was denied. The year was 
1940. In a period not unlike that which set the stage for
Holmes's opinions in Schenck, Froehwerk and Debs, and world
m 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
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war was once again at hand. The Supreme Court, in light of 
the circumstances, chose to listen to argument in the case. 
Patriotism was in the air as the threat of war confronted 
American public opinion.
A committee set up by the American Bar Association 
argued that:
The compulsory flag salute cannot be sustained on 
the ground that public school education is granted 
as a matter of grace so that the requirement, even 
though arbitrary and capricious, can be enforced 
by expulsion from public school...We believe that 
the letter and spirit of our Constitution demand 
vindication of the individual liberties which are 
abridged by the challenged regulation.
The writing of the majority opinion was assigned to
Justice Frankfurter, who had come to the Court only a year
before. And after recalling "many talks with Holmes about
his espionage opinions," which he regarded as providing
guidelines for the flag-salute case, Frankfurter explained
that his opinion would be:
a vehicle for preaching the true democratic faith 
of not relying on the Court for the impossible 
task of assuring a vigorous, mature self- 
protecting and tolerant democracy... This was the 
responsibility of the people and their 
representatives.
...the flag salute is an allowable portion of a 
school program for those who do not invoke 
conscientious scruples is surely not debatable.
But for us to insist that, though the ceremony may 




dissidents, is to maintain that there is no basis 
for a legislative judgment that such an exemption 
might introduce elements of discipline, might cast 
doubts in the minds of other children which would 
themselves weaken the effect of the exercise.
In a letter Frankfurter wrote to Justice Stone, who was
the sole dissenter in Gobitis, one may find a better
understanding of those primary motivations for Frankfurter's
opinion in the case. He wrote:
But no one has more clearly in his mind than you, 
that even when it comes to these ultimate civil 
liberties, insofar as they are protected by the 
Constitution, we are not in the domain of 
absolutes...We are not exercising an independent 
judgment; we are sitting in judgment upon the 
judgment of the legislature... ”
According to Mark Silverstein, Frankfurter never 
considered the judiciary the primary protector of civil 
liberties. Such a position would have, from Frankfurter's 
perspective, severely restricted the Court's flexibility. 
Justice Frankfurter emerges here as both a civil libertarian 
as well as a firm believer in judicial restraint. If the 
Court was to be responsible for protecting civil liberties, 
it would loose the ability to weigh and balance critical 
elements of judicial statesmanship. The judge's view of 
statesmanship and the judiciary called for judicial
164 Id.
^Frankfurter to Justice Harlan Fiske Stcme, 5/27/40 (As cited in 
Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths (Ithaca:Cornell University 
Press, 1984) P. 145
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enforcement of principles that would aid a progressive
society in the accomplishment of its common goals. ̂
Frankfurter, echoing Holmes, believed that the place of
the judiciary in American government included its necessary
reinforcement of federalism, and thus that the states might
serve as "laboratories" for social change. In his view, the
Supreme Court, during the twentieth century, had used the
due process clause to restrict the police power of the
states, and in so doing inhibited their function as the
place for such innovation. In his book, The Public and Its
Government, we may find Frankfurter's ideal for our
republic, "In simple truth, the difficulties that government
encounters from law do not inhere in the Constitution. They
are due to the judges that interpret it..." Here again, not
unlike his predecessors Marshall and Holmes, Frankfurter
recognized the danger implicit in putting too much power in
the Court. In so doing he also acknowledged that,
constitutional adjudication was an exercise in statecraft
and that the Constitution was, "not a text for
interpretation but the means of ordering the life of a
167progressive people."-"’'
m ld. at P. 148
^  Felix Frankfurter, The Public and Its Government, (New 
Haven:Yale University Press, 1930), P. 79-80, P. 76
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In Gobitis, Frankfurter had taken the side of the
legislative judgment that the symbolic importance of the
flag salute served as part of the foundations for social
unity. His words spoke to this belief:
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the 
binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such sentiment 
is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and 
spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions 
of a people, transmit them from generation to 
generation, and thereby create that continuity of 
a treasured life which constitutes a civilization.
We live by symbols. °
Three years later, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v Barnette. the Court reversed itself and held
that participation in patriotic exercises could not be
demanded of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Frankfurter's dissent,
although he might well have argued to the contrary, was
undoubtedly motivated by his strong sense of patriotism. One
can hardly understand it as a non-political choice:
One who belongs to the most vilified and 
persecuted minority in history is not likely to be 
insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our 
Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude 
relevant, I should wholeheartedly associate myself 
with the general libertarian views in the Court's 
opinion, representing as they do the thought and 
action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither 
Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic...
As a member of the Court I am not justified in 
writing my private notion of policy into the 
Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish 
them or how mischievous I may deem their 
disregard... The constitutional protection of 
religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did
^®Si5>ra. Note 161 (Minersville School District v Gobitis)
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not create privi1eges...Law is concerned with 
external behavior and not with the inner life of 
m a n ...
As a result of the Gobitis decree, several children of 
the Jehovah's Witnesses had been expelled from the West 
Virginia schools, and were threatened with incarceration in 
reformatories. A group of the parents of these children 
challenged the law and its regulations, claiming that it was 
an invasion of individual rights. Suing in the federal 
district court in Charleston, Walter Barnette, Paul Stull 
and Lucy McClure asked for an injunction to stop enforcement 
of the compulsory ruling against Jehovah's Witnesses.
The state board of education asserting its authority, 
cited Gobitis. and asked that the complaint be dismissed. A 
special bench was designated to hear the case, and Judge 
Parker and his colleagues chose not to follow the Gobitis 
precedent. The West Virginia Board of Education appealed the 
decision directly to the Supreme Court, as the law provided 
it might do, and the case was heard on March 11, 1943.
On June 14, 1943, in a 6 to 3 vote, the Supreme Court 
handed down a decision in West Virginia Board of Education 
v. Barnett. reversing the Gobitis decision. The dissenting 
votes were by Justices Roberts and Reed, who chose not to 
join in the dissenting opinion as written by Frankfurter.
^ Vest Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624
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They merely noted that they adhered to the views as had been
expressed in Gobitis. Justice Frankfurter remained faithful
to the premise which had influenced his earlier decision.
"One may have the right to practice one's religion and at
the same time owe the duty of formal obedience to laws that
run counter to one's beliefs,”170 he wrote.
In Max Freedman's superb compilation of correspondence
between Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Felix Frankfurter, the
words that the author chooses to add after including a large
portion of Frankfurter's dissent in Barnette offer an
interesting sidelight to our examination of Frankfurter and
his life on the Court. Freedman writes:
At the Hyde Park discussion of the Gobitis case, 
of which Frankfurter made a record, Mrs. Roosevelt 
said she would not presume to question 
Frankfurter's legal scholarship and reasoning. But 
there seemed to her to be something wrong with an 
opinion, both in logic and in justice, that forced 
little children to salute a flag when such a 
ceremony was repugnant to their existence... The 
President disagreed. He said with great emphasis 
that what the local authorities were doing to the 
children was 'stupid, unnecessary, and offensive' 
but it fell within the proper limits of their 
legal power. That was an exact statement of 
Frankfurter's own position.
The case of Bridges v. California was decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1941. Harry Bridges, a West Coast labor 
leader, had been held in contempt of the California courts
170 Id.
1 7 1 Roosevelt and Frankfurter, Their Correspondence 1928-1945. ed. 
Max Freedman, (Boston: Little Broun and Ccnpany, 1967) P. 701
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for sending a telegram to the Secretary of Labor which he 
subsequently had published in several newspapers. In this 
telegram he had warned that a strike would take place if the 
state courts chose to enforce an "outrageous" decision in a 
labor case. The state courts had found that the publication 
of the telegram interfered with the orderly administration 
of justice, and on an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Bridges argued that the contempt citation had abridged his 
constitutionally protected freedom of speech.7̂
Bridges had originally been argued during the 1940 
term, and the vote had been 6-3 to affirm the conviction. 
However, in his original draft opinion for the Court, and in 
his subsequent dissenting opinion, Frankfurter reinforced 
the same ideas. He argued that there was no doubt but that 
freedom of expression was "implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty," but that what was of greater significance 
was that the measure of any freedom was in the specific 
nature of that freedom and the means by which it had been 
curtailed .̂
Mark Si 1verstein's rendering of Frankfurter's rationale 
here is that according to Frankfurter, the task of the
377314 U.S. 252 (1941) (This case was consolidated with a similar 
case which involved the Los Angeles Times. that had, in an editorial 




judiciary was to balance, measure, and mediate. Freedom of
expression was not an absolute order. It was a principle to
be laid out and predicated upon the circumstances of a
particular case. To treat freedom of speech as an absolute
would prevent courts from controlling its impact on other,
equally important values. He argues that throughout
Frankfurter's draft opinion as well as in his published
dissent, there is a consistent message that there must be a
delicate balance between order and freedom. ^  Frankfurter's
dissenting 1941 opinion included these words:
By the Constitution of California... the citizens 
of the state have chosen to place in its courts 
the power, as we have defined it, to insure 
impartial justice. If the citizens of California 
have other desires, if they want to permit the 
free play of modern publicity in connection with 
pending litigation, it is within their easy power 
to say so and have their way.'
It is interesting to note that Justice Black, the 
justice who was later to become the absolutist as it 
referred to First Amendment doctrine, chose in his draft 
dissent written during the 1940 hearing to use the "clear 
and present danger test." After commenting that the Court 
did have the powers Frankfurter had alluded to in his 
original draft opinion, Black wrote:
374Mark Silverstein, Constitutional Faiths (Ithaca:Cornell 
University Press, 1984) P. 180.
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Considering the values of the constitutional 
liberties that are here abridged, I believe it 
would be much better to say that state courts 
should never punish for contempt in such cases 
unless there was found to be a clear and present 
danger of an immediate interference which could 
not be averted without the imposition of 
punishment.
Not unlike Holmes, Frankfurter remained firm in his 
belief that it was the responsibility of the judge to find 
solutions that meshed with the "felt necessities of the 
times." We may also see a foreshadowing of the position he 
would take in his concurrence in Kovacs v Cooper(1949).
The Court's emphasis on the importance of First 
Amendment rights had led to what has been called the 
"preferred freedom" doctrine. The phrase was first used by 
Chief Justice Stone in his dissent in Jones v Opelika
(1941), (in which the Court upheld local licensing fees for 
those who sold goods; as applied to Johovah's Witnesses 
selling their literature.) In part, the Chief Justice had 
written:
The First Amendment is not confined to 
safeguarding freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe 
them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by 
virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, has 
put them in a preferred position.
111316 U.S. 584, 608 (1941)
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In Frankfurter's concurrence in Kovacs (1949) he chose 
to take issue with Justice Reed's majority opinion in its 
reference to "the preferred position of freedom of speech." 
His objections were that "it expresses a complicated process 
of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula," and 
that it is, "a mischievous phrase, if it carries the 
thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law touching 
communication is infected with presumptive invalidity."^
Christopher Wolfe believes that Frankfurter's point was
that protection of speech must sometimes be balanced against
other values. The legislature has the primary responsibility
for this. We must, in other words, approach the
constitutionality of a law as it applies to free speech in
179the same manner as we would any other law.
Another wartime decision presented Felix Frankfurter 
with the need that he balance a legislative judgment against 
intervention by the Court. Not unlike the experience of his 
mentor, Frankfurter found himself also facing the question 
of whether the deprivation of individual liberties are open 
to re-consideration in specific circumstances. In light of 
his opinion in the Schneiderman case, decided in 1943, one 
gathers that Frankfurter believed, as did Holmes before him,
178336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949)
1 79Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modem Judicial Review (Supra 
Note 16, P. 250.
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that government security must under certain circumstances 
take precedence, even when it meant that the rights of 
specific individuals were jeopardized. Predicated upon such 
a rationale, the Justice Department had attempted to revoke 
the citizenship of naturalized citizens of German and 
Italian origin who had obtained citizenship illegally or 
under false pretenses. The case of Schneiderman v United 
States7̂ , was decided by the Court in 1943. William 
Schneiderman, a Communist born in Russia in 1905, had come 
to the United States in 1908, and in 1927 had applied for 
citizenship. He had by that time joined several Communist 
groups. In 1932, he ran for governor of Minnesota as the 
Communist party candidate. In 1939, the government moved to 
strip him of his American citizenship on the grounds of his 
Communist activities in the five years preceding his 
naturalization as an American citizen, arguing that he had 
not been truly attached to the principles of the U.S. 
Constitution. Schneiderman maintained that he did not 
believe in using force or violence, and that he had been a 
good citizen, had never been arrested and had used his 
rights as a citizen to advocate change and greater social 
justice.
The Schneiderman case came before the Court in 1942, 
concurrent with the United States' entrance into the Second
180 320 U.S. 118 (1943)
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World War, and its acknowledgment of the Soviet Union as an
ally. Schneiderman was represented by Wendell Wilkie, a man
who had run as the Republican candidate for president in
1940. Wilkie pleaded with the Court not to establish a legal
rule that a person could be punished for alleged adherence
to abstract principles. At a pre-decision Court conference
on December 5, 1942, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
presented a strong statement that the government should have
the power to rid the country of agitators who didn't believe
in the Constitution, but worked actively to overthrow the 
I S !government.
Melvin Urofsky comments that, bearing in mind
Frankfurter's idolization of Holmes and Brandeis, one might
have expected him to speak in defense of Schneiderman, not
unlike the manner in which Holmes had defended Rosika 
132Schwimmer. Frankfurter nonetheless supported Stone, and 
explained his reasons in great length. This case, he began, 
"arouses in me feelings that could not be entertained by 
anyone else around this table." He went on to talk about his 
work in the U.S. Attorney's office in dealing with 
naturalization cases and confessed that, "as one who has no 
ties with formal religion, perhaps the feelings that
787As cited in Melvin I. Urofsky, Judicial Restraint and 
Individual Liberties (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991) P. 70.
182 Id. at P. 170.
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underlie religious forms for me run into intensification of 
my feelings about American citizenship."
For Frankfurter, "American citizenship implies entering 
upon a fellowship which binds people together by devotion to 
certain feelings and ideas and ideals summarized as a 
requirement that they be attached to the principles of the 
Constitution." While mere membership in the Communist party 
did not constitute grounds for either denying or revoking 
citizenship, Frankfurter believed that Schneiderman's 
actions had gone far beyond paying dues. He had made a 
commitment to a "holy cause" and "no man can serve two 
masters when two masters represent not only different, but
JQ9in this case, mutually exclusive ideas."
The Court handed down its decision, and ruling for 
Schneiderman the majority held that a naturalized person 
couldn't be deprived of citizenship without the clearest 
justification. Justice Stone, joined by Frankfurter and 
Roberts, dissented vigorously.7̂
Felix Frankfurter, a naturalized citizen himself, 
clearly believed that he owed his total allegiance to the 
United States. Communists could not possibly share that 
sense of identity to this nation. In this instance, freedom
^Summary of discussion at Conference, 5 December 1942, FF-HLS 
(as cited in Melvin Urofsky, P. 70-71)
784Supra Note, at 175.
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of belief was not applicable. In reaffirmation of that point
of view he had enunciated some three years earlier,
Frankfurter wrote:
...the relentless choice events may force on every 
individual cannot be met by such a fair sounding, 
pernicious abstraction as that 'war never settled 
anything.185
Clearly, Stone and Frankfurter had not been interested 
in disproving the concept that war never settles anything. 
They were, however, interested in conveying the idea that 
congressional belief in the efficacy of an oath to defend 
this country had its basis in human reason, and that it must 
prevail in this instance. The Court's action in overriding 
the need for such an oath was, in Frankfurter's view, 
counter to the desires of the legislature, and it might well 
be argued that his choice to dissent in this case was based 
on deference to legislative authority, as well as the 
Judge's pervasive patriotism. Beyond this, one can see 
further evidence of his preference that policy be based on a 
moderate "balancing" of interests. In this instance, he 
apparently believed that the scales must be balanced in the 
direction of congressional supremacy.
The year 1948 brought still another case to the Court 
that dealt with the issues of congressional power over 
immigration and naturalization. This, the case of Ludecke v
^  Felix Frankfurter, New York Times. June 19, 1941.
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IOCWatkins . concerned a German enemy alien, who, after a
hearing held under the authority of the Attorney General, a
hearing not required by any provision of the Alien Enemy
Act, had been directed to be deported from the United States
based on the finding that he was dangerous to the public
peace and safety.
Ludecke's petition for habeas corpus had been denied by
the lower courts, and it was in the opinion that Frankfurter
wrote for the Court that this petition was again denied.
Responding to argument that the petitioner was not
dangerous, and that the war was over but not in a legal
sense, Frankfurter took the position that the Attorney
General's decision had been warranted as part of the
executive's prerogative. It was up to the executive and the
legislature to notify the Court of the war's end. The
President's choice to have a non-reviewable war power
exercised within narrower limits than were legislatively
permitted did not provide sufficient reason for judicial
intervention. The concluding words of his dissent may help
to define Frankfurter's position here:
we hold that full responsibility for the just 
exercise of this great power may validly be left 
where the Congress has constitutionally placed it- 
-on the President of the United States.
186335 U.S. 160 (1948) 
187 Id. at P. 173.
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Although this presidential power might be abused, 
judicial review was not called for until some flagrant 
violation had taken place. Congress had the power to draw up 
schemes of naturalization, and the president was the primary 
holder of war power. Once again deferring to
constitutionally granted higher authority, Frankfurter found 
no reason for the intervention of the judiciary. His 
tendency to defer to legislative judgment may well have been 
based on a belief that only in those cases of extreme 
overbearance by the representative body should the Court 
move to interfere with its actions. Such perceived occasions 
would apparently bring a change in his judicial stance, and 
the 1950s brought what might be construed as a softening in 
his view on this issue. Whether in fact this was the case is 
subject to inquiry.
Helen Shirley Thomas argues that the Justice strongly 
enunciated antipathy toward a doctrinal approach to 
constitutional law. This had resulted in a partial 
repudiation of the "clear and present danger test" as it
10Qdealt in the area of subversive activities. She adds that 
Frankfurter admitted that in certain instances legislative 
judgment concerning the threat to society had been 
exaggerated, and this, unfettered individual expression 
should not be tampered with. He did, however, also accept
788Supra Note at 64.
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what he considered the other equally important part of the 
equation, that when some reasonable argument could be made 
for legislative fears that a direct and positive danger 
threatened this country's self-preservation, even the action
iogof individuals must be curtailed. 07
Frankfurter's sense of the "clear and present danger" 
doctrine was that its original reason for existing had been 
Holmes's interest in protecting public security. Those 
desirous of specifically protecting absolute freedom for 
individuals or groups had distorted its meaning, choosing to 
use it in areas where individual or group rights were at 
stake.
In the case of Dennis v United States7̂ 7. the Court 
chose to use the words of Holmes and Brandeis, finding its 
own road toward an attempted understanding of what they 
really meant. It has been argued that the Court destroyed 
the "clear and present danger test" and upheld the 
punishment of alleged conspiracies to overthrow the
IQ]government at some uncertain time in the future.
The meaning of judicial restraint according to Felix 
Frankfurter was that the decision of Congress must be
189 Id at P. 212-213 
190341 U.S. 494 (1951)
998See Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter. Supra Note. 42.,
P. 197
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accepted as final unless such action can be proven to be 
without reason. At issue in Dennis was whether the 
provisions of the Smith Act that made it a crime to teach or 
advocate the overthrow of this government, or to help 
organize or be a member of any group advocating or teaching 
such overthrow were justiciable. The United States in the 
year 1948 found itself in a changed political climate. The 
Soviet Union was no longer our ally, and the Cold War had 
begun.
The government had obtained indictments against twelve 
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 
alleging a conspiracy against the United States in violation 
of the provisions of the Smith Act. The trial which lasted 
more than six months was held in the Southern District of 
New York before Judge Harold Medina. In a jury verdict, the 
defendants were found guilty, and the convictions were 
affirmed on appeal in a decision rendered for the Federal 
Circuit Court by Judge Learned Hand. Hand's words presented 
a restatement of the "clear and present danger test," In 
each case (courts) must ask whether the gravity of the evil, 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of
199free speech as is necessary to avoid danger." In Justice 
Hand's view, the weighing of the evil and the value of free 
speech belonged to the legislature. Because it was often
^ United States v Dennis 183 F.2nd 201 (2 Cir. 1950)
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impossible for legislatures to undertake such balancing in 
specific situations, it was correct for the Court (and not
jg*the jury) to act in place of the legislature.
Frankfurter's opinion was filed as a concurrence with
the Supreme Court's decision. His words are worthy of
important consideration here. They present with great
clarity that point of view which he attempted to maintain:
Congress has determined that the danger created by 
advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing 
restriction on freedom of speech. The 
determination was made after due deliberation, and 
the seriousness of the congressional purpose is 
attested by the volume of legislation passed to 
effectuate the same ends.
Can we say that the judgment Congress exercised 
was denied it by the Constitution? Can we 
establish a constitutional doctrine which forbids 
the elected representatives of the people to make 
this choice? Can we hold that the First amendment 
deprives Congress of what it deemed necessary for 
the Government's protection? To make validity of 
legislation depend on judicial reading of events 
still in the womb of time--a forecast, that is, of 
the outcome of forces at best appreciated only 
with knowledge of the topmost secrets of nations-- 
is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its 
equipment.
Hugo Black, the Justice with whom Frankfurter was often 
to disagree as it concerned the issue of First Amendment 
jurisprudence offered a much shorter (only three page) 
opinion in the case. Stating that it served no useful 
purpose that he present an extended discussion of his
794Supra Note 186, P. 550-551.
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disagreement with the Court's decision, as it simply stemmed
from a fundamental difference in Constitutional approach,
Black went on to say that:
So long as this Court exercises the power of 
judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree 
that the First Amendment permits us to sustain 
laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on 
the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 
'reasonableness.' Such a doctrine waters down the 
First Amendment so that it amounts to little more 
than an admonition to Congress.
In 1957, Justice Frankfurter wrote opinions in Watkins 
and in Sweezv. In both cases he wrote in concurrence with 
the Court's result. In each of these decisions, he argued 
that a man, who in the issues under review, had been judged 
punishable for refusing to answer questions in an 
investigation of Communist activities, had been convicted 
improper 1v .
Watkins v. United States was a prosecution under Title 
2 United States Code Section 192 for the misdemeanor of 
"contempt of Congress." This statute provided penalty for 
refusal to answer questions which were considered "pertinent 
to the question under inquiry." In refusing to answer 
certain questions asked of him by the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, Watkins had been convicted under the 
statute by the lower federal courts. Frankfurter's words do
195341 U.S. 550-551
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more toward a better understanding of his judicial
philosophy than that one might provide in paraphrasing them:
By...making the federal judiciary the affirmative 
agency for enforcing the authority that underlies 
the congressional power to punish for contempt,
Congress necessarily brings into play the specific 
provisions of the Constitution relating to the 
prosecution of offenses and those implied 
restrictions under which the Courts function...To 
turn to the immediate problem before us, the scope 
of inquiry that a committee is authorized to 
pursue must be defined with sufficiently 
unambiguous clarity to safeguard a witness from 
the hazards of vagueness in the enforcement of the 
criminal process against which the Due Process 
Clause protects ...While implied authority for the 
questioning by the Committee, sweeping as was its 
inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated 
acquiescence by Congress of the Committee's 
inquiries, the basis for determining the 
petitioner's guilt is not thereby laid...The 
circumstances of this case were wanting in these 
essentials. (*my italics)
It may well be argued that Frankfurter's opinion in 
Watkins showed no real change in his view as to the role of 
the judiciary. It is also conceivable that it does not 
indicate a more openminded reading of the First Amendment. 
Freedom of speech was not at issue in his concurrence in the 
Watkins case. It is further elaboration of Frankfurter's 
chosen stance that the Court must remain apolitical, and in 
the view of some an evocation of his judicial restraint. 
Frankfurter's decision in the Watkins case underlined 
constitutional issues. It spoke specifically to that
1915354 U.S. 178 (1957)
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"constitutionally allowable" realm in which the Supreme
Court could intervene in the business of the legislature.
In his examination of the relationship shared by
Frankfurter and Black, Mark Silverstein states that
throughout the 1950's, Frankfurter's ad hoc balancing took
the middle ground between the absolutism of Black and
Douglas and the apparent abnegation of Justices Clark and
Burton. He argues that during the days of the McCarthy era,
Frankfurter and Harlan offered leadership as they disposed
of cases by using procedural grounds or statutory
interpretation as their rationale. Frankfurter stood in the
swing position on the Court. What the votes of Harlan and
Frankfurter served to accomplish proved critical in
reversing the Court's direction and in sustaining the power 
197of Congress. The decision in Sweezv provides a somewhat 
different picture of Justice Frankfurter.
igoIn Sweezv v. New Hampshire, the Attorney General of 
New Hampshire, operating under a resolution of the state 
legislature, embarked upon an investigation to determine 
whether the state subversive activities act was being 
violated. Sweezy, a professor at the state university, was 
asked to testify. When asked about his past Communist 
affiliations, Sweezy denied ever having been a member of the
19 7 Supra Note 173, P. 204-205 
198354 U.S. 234 (1957)
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Communist party, but refused to respond when asked questions
that concerned the Progressive party. Additionally, he
refused to respond when questioned about a lecture he had
given at the university. He was found in contempt of court,
and the state court proceeded to confirm the conviction. A
six-man majority of the Supreme Court reversed the state
court's decision, but chose to avoid any first amendment
issues. They held that the failure of the state legislature
to stipulate, when granting authority to the Attorney
General, that it wished the type of information these
questions attempted to elicit, was in their judgment a
violation of due process. Frankfurter's concurrence, as
joined by Harlan, selected to center his opinion around
Sweezy's First Amendment rights:
Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of 
hypothesis and speculation. The more so is true in 
the pursuit of understanding in the groping 
endeavors of what are called the social sciences, 
the concern of which is man and
society...Whatever, on the basis of massive proof 
and in the light of history of which this Court 
may well take judicial notice, be the 
justification for not regarding the Communist 
Party as a conventional political party, no such 
justification has been afforded in regard to the 
Progressive Party...For society's good-^if 
understanding be an essential need of society-- 
inquiries into these problems, speculations about 
them, stimulation in others of reflection upon 
them, must be left as unfettered as possible...
199 Jcf. at 261, 267
131
There can be no doubt that academic freedom was of 
particular significance for Felix Frankfurter. Both as a 
teacher of law, and appropriate to his belief that education 
was integral to the development of a progressive society, 
his decision in Sweezy does not indicate any dramatic change 
in Frankfurter's personal philosophy. Here had been another 
professor attempting to lead his students in the direction 
of further understanding, and in ruling against the state of 
New Hampshire, Justice Frankfurter ne Professor Frankfurter, 
seemingly readjusted his over-riding belief in federalism, 
balancing it against the importance of a "laboratory of 
ideas". Frankfurter had surely selected in this case to 
suppress his belief in judicial restraint. It would appear 
that in his view, the social worth of what Professor Sweezy 
had done in the classroom took precedence over some supposed 
shortsightedness which the state had alleged. What is 
questionable is whether Frankfurter's opinion was not in 
fact "political," and if he had not permitted himself the 
luxury of reinforcing Holmes's view that law was what judges 
decided it was.
The decision of the Court in Barenblatt v. United 
States^  represented a departure from Sweezy. which had 
placed limits on the ability of congressional committees to 
inquire into political beliefs and associations. Barenblatt,
2OO360 U.S. 109 (1959)
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decided by a vote of 5 to 4, found Felix Frankfurter
standing with the majority. The case concerned a Lloyd
Barenblatt, a man who had previously served as a psychology
instructor at the University of Michigan and at Vassar
College. Subpoenaed to testify before the House Un-American
Activities Committee, Barenblatt had refused to answer
questions pertaining to his past or present membership in
the Communist Party and in other groups, arguing that the
First Amendment prohibited an investigation of his political
beliefs and associations. After being convicted of contempt
of Congress, Barenblatt appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court. Although Frankfurter wrote no opinion in this
case, he selected to join with the majority in denying the
plaintiff's request. Justice Harlan, with whom Frankfurter
had often voted, wrote the opinion for the Court, upholding
the Committee's authority against First Amendment claims of
freedom of expression and association, concluding that:
...Undeniably, the First Amendment in some 
circumstances protects an individual from being 
compelled to disclose his associational 
relationships. However, the projections of the 
First Amendment, unlike a proper claim of the 
privilege against self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment, do not afford a witness the right 
to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where 
First Amendment rights are asserted to bar 
governmental interrogation, resolution of the 
issue always involves a balancing by the courts of 
the competing private and public interests... the 
balance between the individual and governmental
133
interests here at stake must be struck in favor of 
the latter.
Helen Shirley Thomas's belief that the Court, including 
Justice Frankfurter, felt that the questions asked were 
germane to the subject under investigation, and that the 
relationship was made very clear to the witness,7̂  remains 
open to question.
Frankfurter had concurred in Watkins using as his 
reasoning his concern for that "constitutionally allowable" 
realm in which the Supreme Court could intervene in the 
business of the legislature. He obviously believed such an 
area open to criticism existed. In Barenblatt he had 
returned to a position of judicial restraint from which 
balancing the rights of the individual against those of 
government followed. This inconsistency in Frankfurter's 
record is often difficult to reconcile. It also leaves open 
the issue of whether he can be understood to have presented 
a consistent and definable philosophical position.
Although it preceded Barenblatt, the case of 
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952)^ provides insight into 
Frankfurter's jurisprudence in the area of First Amendment 
adjudication. In this case, the Court was faced with a
201 Id. at P. 143.
282Supra Note at 64, P. 284.
203343 U.S. 250 (1952)
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criminal libel case involving an Illinois statute that made 
criminal any publication that portrayed "depravity, 
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of 
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" which 
subjects them "to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is 
productive of breach of peace or r i o t s . T h e  defendant 
Beauharnais was president of a racist Chicago organization, 
the White Circle League, which had distributed racist 
leaflets. The leaflets called on the mayor and city council 
of Chicago, "to halt the further encroachment, harassment 
and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods 
and persons, by Negro." He urged "one million self 
respecting people to unite," stating that "if persuasion and 
the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized 
by the Negro will not unite us, then the aggressions... 
rapes, robbers, knives, guns and marijuana of the Negro, 
surely wi11 . "
In his defense to the Illinois Courts, Beauharnais had 
asked that the jury be instructed that he could not be found 
guilty unless the leaflets were "likely to produce a clear 
and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises
yncfar above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest." The 
Illinois Court ignored this admonition, and he was
284Id. at 251 (Quoting the 111. Rev. Statutes— 1949)
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convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed this conviction in an 
opinion written by Justice Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter 
argued that a sharp distinction existed between restrictions 
on political speech and restrictions that related to race, 
color, creed or religion. These terms he argued had, 
"attained too fixed a meaning to permit political groups to 
be brought within" their rubric, and therefore stood outside 
the protection of the First Amendment. "Of course," he 
commented, "discussion cannot be denied and the right, as 
well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled." For 
him, there was nothing "political" about this speech. It 
didn't rise above the level of "discussion." "If a statute 
sought to outlaw libels of political parties, quite 
different problems not now before us would be raised ..while 
this Court sits, it retains and exercises authority to 
nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance
n n c
under the guise of punishing libel."
The year was 1952, and the decision in this case was
characteristic of its time in history. Today, libelous
speech stands within the protective arms of the First 
9 0 7Amendment , but obscene speech continues to be regarded as
9 0Soutside the parameters of First Amendment adjudication.
287See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
288See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 478 (1957)
136
Frankfurter, reinforced here that "fighting words" point of
view which had been penned in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
(1942).^ Specific "well-defined and narrowly limited"
categories of speech fell outside of the bounds of
constitutional protection, and therefore, "the lewd and
obscene, the profane, and libelous, and in this case,
"fighting" words, did not fall under the protection of the
First Amendment. It is also clear that in his judgment, this
case did not fall within the province of the Court.
Frankfurter had chosen in this case, as he had often
done, to defer to both the State of Illinois and to the
principle of stare decisis. The decision in Chaplinsky had
to stand. Frankfurter did not distinguish between First
Amendment cases and the Commerce Clause. His opinion in
Beauharnais echoed the rational basis test the Court had
adopted to deal with economic policy questions. If the
assembly had a rational basis for choosing as it did, the
7 1 0courts should not second-guess legislative wisdom.
Justice Hugo Black's dissent in the Beauharnais case
may perhaps provide what in the judgment of some represents
the appropriate refutation of Frankfurter's position here:
We are told that freedom of petition and 
discussion are in o danger 'while this court 
sits.' This case raises considerable doubt. Since
m 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
210Supra Note 181, P. 113
137
those who peacefully petition for changes in the 
law are not to be protected 'while this court 
sits,' who is? I do not agree that the 
Constitution leaves freedom of petition, assembly, 
speech, press or worship at the mercy of a case- 
by-case, day-by-day majority of the Court...To say 
that a legislative body can, with this Court's 
approval, make it a crime to petition for and 
publicly discuss proposed legislation seems as 
farfetched to me as it would be to say that a 
valid law could be enacted to punish a candidate 
for president for telling the people his 
views...If there be minority groups who hail this 
holding as their victory, they might consider the 
possible relevancy of this ancient remark:
'Another such victory and I am undone.'777
Frankfurter and Black undoubtedly saw the
responsibilities of a Supreme Court justice from very
different angles. Despite the powerful position taken by the
judiciary, the perception of a judge as to his role in
American life is often based in doubt and uncertainty. As
they must proceed without the legitimacy that popular
sovereignty would provide, judges must continue to justify
both to themselves and to the people the exercise of their
judicial authority. The result has been that the American
judicial tradition has been marked with ambiguity. Justices
Black and Frankfurter are part of that tradition.
Oliver Wendell Holmes had written as early as 1897
that:
Behind the logical form (of the judicial opinion) 
lies a judgment as to the relative worth and
211343 U.S. at 274,275. 
n2Sipra Note 174, P.219.
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importance of competing legislative grounds, often 
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is 
true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole 
proceeding. 213
And Justice Cardozo made his own contribution to our
understanding in this area when in 1921 he wrote:
More subtle are the forces so far beneath the 
surface that they cannot reasonably be clasified 
as other than subconscious. It is often through 
these subconscious forces that judges are kept 
consistent with themselves, and inconsistent with 
another... There is in each of us a stream of 
tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy 
or not, which gives coherence and direction to 
thought and action. Judges cannot escape that 
current any more than other mortals. *
Harold J. Spaeth, in the introduction to an interesting 
essay that deals with the voting record of Justice 
Frankfurter and his alleged judicial restraint, argues that, 
there has been a pronounced reluctance to accept the idea 
that most, if not all, judicial decisions are in truth 
products of the judge's attitudes regarding basic policy 
issues. In his view, "Not only for Frankfurter, but for all 
the Warren Court justices, the concept of judicial restraint 
is an effective means of rationalizing responses t° policy-
Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law 
Review 10 (March 1897), P. 465.
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Mew 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) P. 11-12.
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picoriented values."^ Spaeth's position is clearly worthy of 
important consideration.
What is also arguable is that Frankfurter the private 
citizen and Frankfurter the justice of the Supreme Court 
were apparently contradictory characters. The progressive 
pre-Court Frankfurter sought a more "liberal" stance from 
the political arena. The man who sat on the highest court of 
the land appears to have predicated his positions on an 
innate sense of what was to be the basic responsibility of a 
Supreme Court justice. These were not necessarily 
compatible.
Alexander Meiklejohn, a life-long friend of Felix
Frankfurter, cites what he considers to have been, an
argument that sapped the very foundations of American
political freedom. In his extremely patriotic little book,
Political Freedom, The Constitutional Powers of the People.
Meiklejohn adds a quotation which Frankfurter had chosen to
quote authoritatively. It is the majority decision in
Robertson v. Baldwin. rendered in 1897:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first 
ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known 
as the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay 
down any novel principles of government, but 
simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities 
which we had inherited from our English ancestors, 
and which had from time immemorial been subject to
n 1 i; _
Harold J. Spaeth, "The Judicial Restraint of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter— Myth or Reality," 8 Midwest Journal of Political Science. 
1964.
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certain wel1-recognized exceptions arising from
the necessities of the case. In incorporating 
these principles into the fundamental law there 
was no intent of disregarding the exceptions which 
continued to be recognized as if they had been 
formally expressed. ® (*my italics)
In addition, Meiklejohn quotes Felix Frankfurter's own 
words, "That this represents the authentic view of the Bill 
of Rights and the spirit in which it must be construed has 
been recognized again and again in cases that have come here
within the last fifty years.
It is those "exceptions" which would appear to have 
often been part of Frankfurter's First Amendment 
jurisprudence. What must be questioned is whether he 
considered them as such simply because he had drawn a
definitive line around the accepted province of the
judiciary, or whether in his frequent deference to the 
legislature, he was not in actuality making a very 
"political" statement.
This highly enigmatic justice, although incessantly 
quoting from Holmes, that man who had become his idol and 
mentor, appeared to take himself far more seriously as a 
judge. Although he often maintained that Holmes's skepticism 
was his own, one must wonder whether he was not, as his
AW
As cited in Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom The 
Constitutional Powers of the People. (New York: Harper Roe, 1960) P.
101.
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predecessor had been, the product of his past and the era
which produced him. Frankfurter's understanding of the place
the Court must hold in American life is expressed in words
he wrote in 1947:
In a democracy the legislative impulse and its 
expression should come from those popularly chosen 
to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as 
courts are not. The pressure on legislatures to 
discharge their responsibility with care, 
understanding and imagination should be stiffened, 
not relaxed. Above all, they must not be 
encouraged in irresponsible or undisciplined use 
of language. In the keeping of legislatures 
perhaps more than any other aroup is the well­
being of their fellow-men.
These were the evocations of a lifetime student of the 
law, an immigrant Jewish boy from the lower East Side of 
Manhattan, a young student at Harvard who idolized the 
Brahman culture out of which Oliver Wendell Holmes had come. 
Felix Frankfurter was a man who had involved himself with 
great passion in the political life of his adopted country 
before coming to the Court. He was also the defender of 
Sacco and Vanzetti, the relativist who saw law as a response 
to changing times, and the intellectual elitist who as a 
Harvard professor of law found himself a supporter of 
Franklin Roosevelt and suddenly a justice of the Supreme 
Court. Frankfurter was all of these, and it is not difficult 
to understand why he is so hard to place in one specific
 ̂1 Q
Felix Frankfurter, ",Sane Reflections an the Reading of 
Statutes," Columbia Law Review. May, 1947, P. 545-546
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category. His words would often belie his actions, but the 
over-riding desire to "balance" between a sense of political 
obligation and what he believed was the role of the Supreme 
Court remain integral to understanding him. Neither a 
categorical realist or consistent in his use of judicial 
restraint, Frankfurter's career on the Court was often a 
confusing phenomenon.
If the philosophical position taken by Legal Realism 
had been that words are created, defined and applied by 
individuals within the framework of a specific social and 
historical context, thus making each act of judicial 
interpretation an act of social choice, Felix Frankfurter's 
term on the Court would frequently find him confronting the 
viability of such a standard.
He had undoubtedly responded in the Gobitis case to 
the social and historical context within which he found 
himself. This opinion had been predicated upon its relevance 
to the needs of a specific historical period. As Holmes had 
done before him, Frankfurter saw the time of war as 
different than any other. If perhaps the freedom to freely 
practice one's religion was, in ordinary circumstances to be 
a given, the realist in Justice Frankfurter saw wartime as 
that circumstance in which specific social choices were 
mandatory. His opinion in Bridges would follow the same line 
of thought, and in Schneiderman as well, he would indicate
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what he referred to as his "religious" sense of patriotism. 
It was clearly his view that in specific instances legal 
rules did not exist to carry out the logical dictates of 
abstract principles, but must advance practical results in 
particular situations.
In Ludecke, we find him standing with the legal 
absolutists. The year was 1948, and the Second World War was 
over for all intents and purposes, but pointing to the war 
powers of the President, Frankfurter chose here to strictly 
interpret the Constitution. This was an opportunity to stand 
behind his philosophy of judicial restraint, but it seems to 
conceal a highly biased belief in conserving the over-riding 
power of established Constitutional authority.
In his concurrence in the Dennis case Frankfurter's 
opinion is questionable on the grounds that it did in fact 
make a politically preferential statement. Was he not, in 
asking whether the First Amendment could deprive Congress of 
its constitutionally given power to decide what was 
necessary for this country's protection, not in actuality 
speaking from a conservative stance, while also expressing 
an obviously political view? In deferring to Congressional 
supremacy, Frankfurter had selected to put extensive power 
in the hands of the legislature. And although this was not 
outwardly embracing Legal Realism, his obvious subjectivity 
is difficult to ignore. The anti-Communist social milieu in
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which he stood cannot be separated from the choice he made 
here.
In Watkins Frankfurter would take what might be 
construed as another partisan position. By virtue of his 
concurrence in the Court's opinion, and its decision based 
on the latent ambiguity in the procedures of the Un-American 
Activities Committee, Frankfurter was not standing on the 
political sidelines. It is highly possible that he had been 
influenced by the time in which this opinion was rendered. 
The year was 1957, and the House Un-American Activities 
Committee had fallen into disfavor. Although he undoubtedly 
preferred that his opinion be construed as a reaffirmation 
of the necessary non-intervention of the Court in matters of 
national policy, Frankfurter's decision to rule for Watkins 
made a "silent" but important social statement.
Sweezv as well does not provide us with entirely 
objective behavior. Frankfurter's decision was influenced by 
his own history, and by a very personal philosophy regarding 
education and educators. There was no discernable "judicial 
restraint" in the choice he made in this case. As a man who 
had spent so much of his life as a professor of law, his 
opinion was a straightforward evocation of a belief that 
education played an integral role in the development of a 
progressive society. Social awareness was clearly his
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motivation, and we find him underlining realist 
epistemology.
His concurrence in the Court's opinion in Barenblatt 
once more put Justice Frankfurter in a variant position. Why 
had he selected in this case to contradict his determination 
in Watkins, using judicial restraint as the rationale? Why 
did he decide to rule here against an educator when he had 
earlier made clear his reason for doing so?
Beauharnais also leaves us with doubt as to 
Frankfurter's calculabi1ity as a judge. This decision found 
him underlining legislative authority, deferring to stare 
decisis. and ignoring the social implications of his choice. 
Often the highly verbal advocate of judicial restraint as 
well as the quiescent voice of Legal Realism, Felix 
Frankfurter's First Amendment decisions leave us with a 
confusing vagueness. Not casting any aspersions on his 
sincerity, one cannot help but attribute much of this 
discontinuity to his earliest beginnings. Frankfurter sought 
throughout his judicial life to maintain a system conserving 
position. His professed judicial restraint was often an 
effort to underline what he believed to be a justice's 
necessary deference to the higher authority of the 
Constitution and the legislature. Nonetheless, it is clear 
that there are political implications in those opinions he 
rendered. Some of this confusion may be linked to a desire
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to protect the foundations of his adopted country, but it 
also indicated an underlying need to find a true sense of 
"belonging". Never feeling entirely confident that he could 
be accepted by the establishment, Felix Frankfurter assumed 
a centrist position on the Supreme Court. This was a posture 
which found him balancing between a belief that the Court 
must serve as only the mediator between the people and the 
legislature, and an ongoing wish to truly be part of that 
culture which had produced an Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Perhaps his opinion in Dennis. and the choice he made 
there to defer to the New York State legislature, provides 
the place where Frankfurter's awareness of the social 
context joined with his judicial restraint. In line with 
Realism, he had undoubtedly made both a political and social 
choice, a choice predicated upon the societal climate and 
the growing antipathy Americans were feeling toward 
Communism. The often deferential position he would take on 
the issue of state sovereignty as well as legislative 
supremacy was satisfied here as well.
Watkins again provided the opportunity for the Justice 
to make both a political and a system conserving choice. 
Although maintaining that the decision had been made on 
"technical" grounds, Frankfurter's opinion spoke to anything 
but the actions of a passive observer. The year was 1957, 
and it was clear that the Un-American Activities Committee
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had fallen into disfavor. Although he undoubtedly preferred 
that his decision be construed as the necessary non­
intervention of the judiciary in matters of politics, 
Frankfurter's decision was undoubtedly a political one.
How does the decision in Dennis align itself with 
Realism? One must argue that it served as a real enigma. The 
machinations of the Un-American Activities Committee had 
clearly made them a questionable entity. Was Frankfurter 
unaware that the committee had often appeared to infringe on 
the rights of many American citizens? How could he have 
rationally chosen, as he would do here, to in fact condone 
their actions by ruling against the defendants? There is 
good reason to argue that Frankfurter's alleged desire to 
remain apolitical and to defer to Congressional supremacy 
was in this case a highly political stance. In line with a 
realist philosophy, he had surely made a social choice, but 
was this a choice predicated upon an awareness of history 
and the social context in which it was being made, or had he 
choosen to ignore these issues in order to vindicate his 
judicial restraint?
In Watkins and Sweezy we find more confusion. In the 
Watkins case, Frankfurter would take what might be construed 
as a highly political stance by virtue of his concurrence. 
Although he maintained that the decision was based on 
"technical" grounds, and that the defendant had not been
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appropriately informed of his rights, this was clearly an 
act of social choice--hardly an apolitical judgment. The 
year was 1957, and the House Un-American Activities 
Committee had fallen into disfavor. Although he undoubtedly 
preferred that his decision be construed as the necessary 
non-intervention of the judiciary in matters of politics, 
Frankfurter's choice to rule for Watkins made a "silent" 
statement with strong political implications. Sweezy. as 
well, did not provide the apolitical act of a Supreme Court 
justice. Frankfurter's opinion was undoubtedly prejudiced by 
his own history, and by a very personal philosophy. There 
was no obvious "judicial restraint" apparent in the choice 
he would make here. As a man who had spent many years as a 
professor of the law, Frankfurter spoke as a realist, a man 
who recognized the over-riding importance of education and 
the undeniable place educators played in American life.
The case of Barenblatt v. United States. and 
Frankfurter's concurrence in the Court's decision, 
represents further mystification. One must wonder why he 
selected here to contradict his decision in Watkins. 
returning once again to the position of judicial restraint 
which he had so obviously attempted to maintain.
Beauharnais as well leaves us with doubt as to 
Frankfurter's predictability. Arguing that the defendant's 
behavior could not be construed as "political," this opinion
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returned the Justice to the stance of the 1ibertarian--the 
man of social awareness who appeared to have been missing in 
Dennis.
Sometimes the voice of Realism, and often the advocate 
of judicial restraint, Felix Frankfurter's free speech 
decisions leave us with a contradictory pattern that defies 
categorization. He remains as he originally appeared, but in 
many ways as a somewhat less dynamic contributor to the 
history of the Supreme Court than his mentor Holmes.
This casts no aspersions on his sincerity, but rather on the 
undeniable truth of his beginnings. Frankfurter fought 
throughout his judicial life to maintain a system conserving 
position. Perhaps it was this over-riding desire which had 




The introductory portion of this examination defined 
Legal Realism as that school of law which reached its peak 
in the 1930s and early 1940s. It had argued that judicial 
decision making was not and could not be the result of 
logical deduction. The realists claimed that formalism had 
to fail because of the limits of our language and logic and 
the indeterminacy of moral and normative concepts. Under 
such a view, concepts were merely conventions of social 
life.
In presenting such a definition, we have attempted to 
discover whether Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes 
stood as primary examples of such a philosophy. The effort 
toward finding a satisfactory answer to this question has 
necessitated a study of more than just the Supreme Court 
decisions which colored the lives of these two men. Both 
Frankfuter and Holmes surely were the product of their 
beginnings. They were also the outgrowth of years spent in 
defining the responsibilities of a justice on the highest 
court in the American legal system.
150
151
The initial argument made here was that neither man saw 
himself as a dispenser of the societal good, and both 
consistently argued that the Supreme Court must only be the 
"mediator" between the people and the legislature, remaining 
apolitical, and thus not becoming the dispenser of social 
policy. After extensive examination, one must conclude that 
neither justice was successful in producing this desired 
"judicial restraint."
Judicial responsibility often called for them to make 
choices that would have social implications, and thus if we 
are to truly understand them, we must recognize that we 
cannot separate out political philosophy and social 
awareness from their jurisprudence.
Perhaps the important question raised by this study is 
whether one can find a common ground between Legal Realism 
and Judicial Restraint. A judge who defers to the 
legislature, is in fact taking a political position. He is 
not denying his sense of social responsibility. He is simply 
making a subjective evalutation as to how the best interests 
of society might be served. What one cannot ignore are the 
political implications that come of the confluence of these 
two seemingly disparate philosophies of law.
Justice Holmes, proudly underlining his legal 
skepticism, saw no problem with rendering opinions which 
were often contradictory. One can point to his decisions in 
Schenck or Debs as simply subjective evaluations of the
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societal needs of the time. The basis of his jurisprudence 
was that law was a changing phenomenon. To be a judge was to 
first be a human being whose choices were necessarily 
personal responses to specific situations. Of primary 
importance was that the judge must not be the blind 
dispenser of objectified law. He was the subjective 
interlocutor of the law, who in light of the social setting 
of a particular case must make that judgment which as a 
member of the Court he was obi iged to make. I find no 
conflict here with Holmes's stated sense that judicial 
review was appropriate only when legislation deprived 
citizens, without any rational basis, of rights that were 
fundamental and accepted by virtue of tradition. If he was 
responsible as a justice of the Court to render a decision 
in a particular case, Holmes based his choice on a personal 
perception of the societal need, not so often on blind 
compliance with the law of the land.
To the liberals of the early years of the twentieth 
century, Holmes was the prime example of judicial technique. 
In his hands, the judiciary was to remain subservient to the 
will of the majority, and political decisions were to be 
placed in the hands of reform minded legislators who might 
thus produce social change. Unfortunately, this point of 
view would see its fruition in a confusing relationship 
between the Court and the issues of liberalism and democracy
153
during the years that followed his tenure on the Court. 
Justice Holmes's free speech decisions emphasized the power 
of the majority to restrict the speech of the minority. His 
"clear and present danger test" enunciated such a 
phi 1osophy.
Felix Frankfurter, attempting to pick up the scepter
his mentor had handed down, presented a continuation of the
same point of view. An ardent advocate of Supreme Court
deference to the legislature, and thus to the will of the
majority, he argued as Holmes had done before him for
judicial restraint. But for both the mentor and the man who
had become his willing novitiate, judicial restraint seems
simply an idealized view of what each believed the
responsibility of a Supreme Court justice to be. In reality,
their actions on the Court were never entirely consistent
with such a view. It is clear that a judge's choice not to
decide is in fact to decide. Even the restrained jurist is
promulgating policy decisions when he defers. The question
has been asked whether any reasonable individual can believe
that a person who has attained the position of Supreme Court
justice is able to submerge his politics entirely in
9 1 Qdeference to vague notions of judicial restraint. 7
\ qL Harold J. Spaeth and Stuart H. Tager "Activism and Restraints 
Cloak for the Justices' Policy Preferences" Supreme Court Activism and 
Restraint, ed. Stephen C. Hal pern and Charles M. Lamb, (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982) P. 297.
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There is undoubtedly a clear similarity in the 
performances of Holmes and Frankfurter on the bench. Each 
brought ideals to the Court. Together they shared the credo 
of Legal Realism, and in the final analysis were more often 
true to it than not. Realism is not an unequivocal concept. 
It changes in each new historical context and does not 
necessarily speak to either liberal or conservative 
preferences. It can express itself in both activism and 
restraint, and often in the contradictory decisions of our 
Supreme Court justices.
Perhaps what has emerged from this examination is more 
significant than finding a perfect ideological niche for 
either Holmes or Frankfurter. What has developed here is 
only further corroboration of the indeterminacy of their 
records, and the often inconsistent character of their 
decisions. To study their free speech opinions is to 
recognize the ultimate failure of their judicial restraint. 
Although they clearly wished that the Supreme Court serve as 
simply the interlocutor between the American people and 
their representatives, to read Holmes's opinion in Schenck 
or Frankfurter's words in Gobitis it is impossible to ignore 
the political implications to be found there.
Both judges are symbolic of a great tradition. They 
were men who in their devotion to the American Constitution 
and the rule of law attempted to avoid personal preferences.
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It is clear that neither could realistically fulfill such a 
goal. Together, Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter 
stand as distinctive personalities in the history of the 
Supreme Court. To acknowledge their individual tenures is to 
better understand the changing times in which they lived, it 
is also strong reinforcement for a truth which both men 
recognized. A justice of the Supreme Court is also a human 
being, a man who cannot deny his heritage or overlook (no 
matter how hard he trys) the unavoidable politicality of the 
job he has been selected to do. To "judge" entails the 
necessary decisions he or she must make, and to deny this 
reality is to ignore the etymology of the word. Scholars 
have attempted to categorize both of these men, but such an 
endeavor must prove futile. The common thread that binds 
them can be found in the words of Holmes, written in the 
year 1881:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has 
been experience. The felt necessities of the time, 
the prevalent moral and political theories, 
institutions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow men, have a good deal more 
to do than the syllogism in determining, the rules 
by which men should be governed.
Felix Frankfurter and Oliver Wendell Holmes bore living
testament to such a judicial philosophy. It is also
important that we consider the possibility that for men such
^ A s  found in The Caiman Law, Op cit 95.
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as these, a necessary congruence did emerge between their 
obvious belief that a judge's decisions were undoubtedly 
influenced by subjective motivations, and their recognition 
that for this very reason, judicial restraint was a goal 
they must pursue. Regardless of whether they were successful 
or not, this is a highly significant understanding that has 
come of this examination, and may well explain the 
indeterminacy of their records.
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